Hierarchical Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Intragroup and Intergroup Incentives

Yan, Yuyue; Hayakawa, Tomohisa

doi:10.1109/tcns.2023.3242359

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Our numerical examples give a direct evidence that the Pareto improvement is not the same as potentialization. The future direction may include the incentive design for a hierarchical noncooperative system [52] with large amount of agents and the characterization of bargaining and formation behaviors in noncooperative systems. In addition, the case where the time-wise budget constraint (8) can be relaxed to an integral constraint should be investigated so that time-wise deficit/debt can be compensated by the end of the operation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

Yan,

Hayakawa

2024

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

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A Pareto-improving incentive mechanism to improve the weighted social welfare and achieve continual Pareto improvement for a pseudo-gradient-based noncooperative dynamical system is developed. In the proposed approach, the system manager remodels agents' dynamical decision making by collecting taxes from some agents and giving some of the collected taxes to other agents as subsidies with a sustainable budget constraint. Sufficient conditions are derived under which agents' state converges towards the socially maximum state associated with a weighted social welfare function depending on the priority ratio of the agents and the initial state. We present several illustrative numerical examples to illustrate the efficacy of our results and reveal the fact that the potentialization of the payoff structure has a very strong relation to generating Pareto-improving system trajectories.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

Yan,

Hayakawa

2024

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

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“…Moreover, it is known that the agents' selfish decision-making may cause degradation of social welfare. To influence the agents' decision-making, some explicit incentive mechanisms are constructed in the literature with the assumption that agents are following the pseudogradient dynamics [17], [18]. For example, Alpcan et al [18] designed pricing mechanisms to achieve the highest social welfare with the selfish agents driven by the pseudo-gradient dynamics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incorporation of Likely Future Actions of Agents Into Pseudo-Gradient Dynamics of Noncooperative Games

Yan,

Hayakawa

2024

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

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In this paper, we connect cognitive hierarchy theory with the pseudo-gradient dynamics in noncooperative systems to extend the pseudo-gradient dynamics with some prediction behaviors under Level-k thinking. In this framework, each agent believes that he is the most sophisticated person in the noncooperative system and makes the proactive decision according to some strategic reasoning of the other agents' likely actions. Depending on a knowledge network of payoff functions, the modified pseudogradient dynamics are presented under the assumption that the agents may be able to reason the other agents' best-response states and use these predicted states in the pseudo-gradient dynamics. Some sufficient conditions are provided to guarantee stability of a Nash equilibrium with uncertain sensitivity parameters or uncertain knowledge network. The transition of the agents' target state while increasing the cognitive levels for a two-agent noncooperative system with quadratic payoff functions is characterized. We present the utility of our approach for homogeneous and differentiated oligopoly markets. Our result indicates that to ensure asymptotic stability of the differentiated oligopoly markets with Cournot competition under pseudo-gradient dynamics, a larger market with more firms requires more differentiated products.

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Stability and Stabilization of Nash Equilibrium for Noncooperative Systems With Vector-Valued Payoff Functions

Guo,

Hayakawa,

Yan

2023

2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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Hierarchical Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Intragroup and Intergroup Incentives

Cited by 5 publications

References 26 publications

Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

Pareto-Improving Incentive Mechanism for Noncooperative Dynamical Systems Under Sustainable Budget Constraint

Incorporation of Likely Future Actions of Agents Into Pseudo-Gradient Dynamics of Noncooperative Games

Stability and Stabilization of Nash Equilibrium for Noncooperative Systems With Vector-Valued Payoff Functions

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