High‐Fidelity Metaphysics: Ideological Parsimony in Theory Choice

Abstract

Many metaphysicians utilize the virtue‐driven methodology. According to this methodology, one theory is more worthy of endorsement than another insofar as it is more virtuous. In this paper, I show how a theory's overall virtue is shaped by its ideological parsimony – parsimony with respect to the terminology employed in stating the theory. I distinguish between a theory's truth and its fidelity (‘joint‐carvingness’) and the corresponding epistemic and fidelic virtues. I argue that ideological parsimony is not an epistemic virtue but is a fidelic virtue. Insofar as metaphysicians value fidelity, then, ideological parsimony has an important role in theory choice.

Three models of ecological community assembly

“…The neutral model was complex from the start, explicitly assuming a major role for varying immigration rates and steady speciation rates in addition to assuming complete ecological equivalence among species. Its variants are even more complex, and elaborate models are unlikely to have fidelity to the world (Finocchiaro, 2021).…”

The Theoretical Virtues of Theism

“…Second, a theory is quantitatively ideologically simple if it includes the fewest number of theoretical primitives (i.e., undefined terms). For example, suppose one wants to assess the explanatory virtue of two mereological theories that equally explain a given set of metaphysical data-yet the first theory utilises 'part' to provide definitions for the terms 'proper part' and 'overlap' as well as other mereological and compositional relations, whilst the second theory does not, but instead leaves the terms 'proper part' and 'overlap' undefined-then the first theory, in comparison to the second theory, would include a fewer number of theoretical primitives and thus would have greater quantitative ideological simplicity ( [12]). For the second variety, a theory is, first, qualitatively ontologically simple if it postulates the fewest number of kinds (i.e., ontological categories and/or kinds of objects, properties and relations etc.).…”

Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God

“…undefined terms). For example, suppose one wants to assess the explanatory virtue of two mereological theories that equally explain a given set of metaphysical data -yet the first theory utilises uses 'part' to provide definitions for the terms 'proper part' and 'overlap' as well as other mereological and compositional relations, whilst the second theory does not, but instead leaves the terms 'proper part' and 'overlap' undefined -then the first theory, in comparison to the second theory, would include a fewer number of theoretical primitives and thus would have greater quantitative ideological parsimony (Finocchiaro 2021). For the second variety, an explanation is, first, qualitatively ontologically parsimonious if it postulates the fewest number of kinds (i.e.…”

“…Nonetheless, with that said, Swinburne's conception does fit with the new conception of simplicity that is being assumed in the present article. explanatory virtue of a nominalist theory and a platonic realist theory -where the former theory does not posit the existence of abstract objects but takes every existing entity to have a spatial and/or temporal location, and the latter theory does posit the existence of abstract objects -then the former theory, in comparison to the latter theory, would posit (at least) one less kind (of entity) and thus have greater qualitative ontological parsimony (Finocchiaro 2021). Second, an explanation is qualitatively ideologically parsimonious if it includes the fewest number of kinds of theoretical primitives -which, following Finocchiaro (2021, 618), we can individuate by topic.…”