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This article develops and tests two competing arguments regarding how a patron’s diplomatic visits influence the military spending of protégés. One argument posits that a patron’s visits will decrease allies’ defense spending by producing reassurance (reassurance hypothesis). Another perspective contends that such visits will increase allies’ burden sharing by fostering allied partnerships (partnership hypothesis). I test these hypotheses by analyzing US presidential visits to allies and the annual percentage changes in allies’ military spending from 1950 to 2007. I find evidence supporting the reassurance hypothesis, indicating that diplomatic visits by US presidents are associated with lower military expenditures by allies the following year. Furthermore, I find that the negative effect is primarily observed when visits are made in the first 3 years of a presidential term, while visits in the final year of a presidency do not result in significant changes in allied burden sharing. The findings highlight the role of a patron’s travel diplomacy in providing reassurance in military alliances, as well as its unintended consequence for protégés’ foreign policy: reduced alliance contribution.
This article develops and tests two competing arguments regarding how a patron’s diplomatic visits influence the military spending of protégés. One argument posits that a patron’s visits will decrease allies’ defense spending by producing reassurance (reassurance hypothesis). Another perspective contends that such visits will increase allies’ burden sharing by fostering allied partnerships (partnership hypothesis). I test these hypotheses by analyzing US presidential visits to allies and the annual percentage changes in allies’ military spending from 1950 to 2007. I find evidence supporting the reassurance hypothesis, indicating that diplomatic visits by US presidents are associated with lower military expenditures by allies the following year. Furthermore, I find that the negative effect is primarily observed when visits are made in the first 3 years of a presidential term, while visits in the final year of a presidency do not result in significant changes in allied burden sharing. The findings highlight the role of a patron’s travel diplomacy in providing reassurance in military alliances, as well as its unintended consequence for protégés’ foreign policy: reduced alliance contribution.
High-level leader visits serve as credible signals in international relations, as they not only reveal the priorities of states in foreign relations but also convey messages to third parties. Observations of Turkey’s elevated diplomatic encounters with Iran, China, and Russia suggest a potential deviation from the West, while visits to Middle Eastern capitals are interpreted as evidence of Turkey’s Islamization. Beyond these individual cases, is it possible to identify a pattern of motivations that determine Turkey’s visit dynamics? By constructing a novel dataset from primary sources like official state documents, “Turkey Visits,” which spans the period from 1989 to 2022, this study aims to both characterize the distribution patterns of high-level leader visits and investigate the underlying factors that influence these patterns.
ObjectiveWhen and why do U.S. leaders visit their allies or adversaries? Much of the literature on diplomatic visits treats each visit as an independent observation. In this article, we analyze high‐level diplomatic visits as compositional data based on the assumption that they are scarce political resources.MethodsWe conduct a compositional analysis of U.S. high‐level officials' diplomatic visits between 1950 and 2010.ResultsWe find that U.S. diplomatic visits to its allies are defense‐oriented, so leaders spend more time touring them during their security crises to signal reassurance. Additionally, we find that visits to adversaries are motivated by leaders' domestic political concerns, particularly their high public unpopularity. Visiting a hostile country is a challenging and salient foreign policy task, providing a high‐profile opportunity to improve their domestic image and standing. This effect is particularly significant in a divided government, where leaders turn to foreign policy to maximize domestic political impacts amid domestic gridlock.ConclusionThe findings suggest that U.S. leaders travel to allies and adversaries for distinct strategic purposes. Furthermore, our study suggests that future research on diplomatic visits should use a compositional variable approach to better model the dynamics and competitive nature of travel diplomacy.
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