High-risk high-reward investments to mitigate climate change

Andrews, Talbot M.; Delton, Andrew W.; Kline, Reuben

doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0266-y

Cited by 34 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Direct comparisons between MTurk and other samples have found similar patterns of behavior, including in games (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015). Two recent studies using games to study political questions find similar behavior whether played by MTurk workers for $1 stakes or students in the lab for $20 stakes (Andrews, Delton, & Kline, 2018; Del Ponte, Delton, Kline, & Seltzer, 2017). (Note that we also examine a national sample in Study 3 below.)…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Delton

DeScioli

Ryan

2019

Political Psychology

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Delton

DeScioli

Ryan

2019

Political Psychology

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As shown in Table 1, at the two lowest thresholds no players need make risky contributions; at the three highest thresholds, some players Table 1 also predicts a slight drop in risky contributions at the highest threshold. Although players in past work are not robustly sensitive to this subtle prediction, they are robustly sensitive to the need to make more risky contributions at the highest thresholds (Andrews et al, 2018). To be clear, as is typical in game experiments, we do not expect real players to always make the best choices.…”

Section: The Disaster Gamementioning

confidence: 91%

“…Thus, although research with the dictator game and similar games confirms that people will be generous, it does not allow us to answer our question: Can people collectively make good disaster decisions when the problem is complex, affects others, and is a public good? To do this, we draw on and modify the disaster game (Andrews et al, 2018;Barrett & Dannenberg, 2012, 2014Dannenberg et al, 2015;Del Ponte et al, 2017;Milinski et al, 2008Milinski et al, , 2016.…”

Section: The Disaster Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also make contributing complex by modifying the game in three ways (following Andrews et al, 2018). First, players make a binary contribution of either 0 tokens or 20 tokens (i.e., a full 20% of their stake).…”

Section: The Disaster Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Humans and other animals are good at solving these kinds of problems with thresholds, at least when deciding individually and on their own behalf (e.g., Caraco et al, 1980;McDermott et al, 2008;Mishra et al, 2017;Rode et al, 1999). This ability shows up in politics (Arceneaux, 2012;McDermott et al, 2008;Osmundsen & Petersen, 2019) and there is some evidence for it in group decisions (Andrews et al, 2018). Our unique contribution is to ask whether people can make these kinds of complex decisions well for others.…”

Section: The Disaster Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Disaster responses are political. But can citizens make useful disaster decisions? Potential obstacles are that such decisions are complex, involve public goods, and often affect other people. Theories of political decision-making disagree on whether these problems can be overcome. We used experimental economic games that simulate disaster to test whether people are willing and able to prevent disasters for others. Groups of players face a complex task in which options that might help vary in their riskiness. Importantly, although all options are reasonable, which option is most useful depends on the experimental condition. We find that players will pay to help, can identify which option is most useful across experimental conditions, and will pay to learn how best to help. Thus, players were able to make useful and costly decisions to prevent others from experiencing disaster. This suggests that, in at least some situations, citizens may be able to make good disaster decisions.

show abstract

Legislators do not harness voter support for disaster preparedness

Anderson

DeLeo

Taylor

2022

Risk Hazard & Crisis Pub Pol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Natural disasters are worsening, but elected officials have not adequately invested in programs that would improve disaster preparedness. Federal spending and election outcomes have been taken to suggest policymakers' failure to support long-term preparedness results from a lack of interest in disaster preparedness among voters and a pervasive preference among voters for more spending on disaster relief than preparedness. However, our national survey experiment on state legislators and public preferences shows that the public is equally interested in disaster preparedness and relief and that both the public and legislators are open to increases in spending on preparedness. The support for preparedness can be motivated by information about past disaster losses rather than having to make difficult predictions about future losses. This study suggests the lack of preparedness spending stems not from voter disinterest, but from a failure of legislators to harness voter support for preparedness. Specifically, the legislators included in our study report being less responsive to attentive voters' preferences on preparedness than relief.

show abstract

High-risk high-reward investments to mitigate climate change

Cited by 34 publications

References 26 publications

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game

Legislators do not harness voter support for disaster preparedness

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About