“High-Tech” Antitrust: Incoherent, Misguided, Obsolete, or None of the Above? Comments on Crandall-Jackson and Wright

Brennan, Timothy J.

doi:10.1007/s11151-011-9296-6

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Bruce Owen makes the point that vertical arrangements for regulated firms are less likely to be welfare enhancing than for unregulated firms because they can enable a regulated firm to escape regulatory constraints, and therefore there is more of a role for antitrust. Brennan (2011), in his comment on Crandall and Jackson, reinforces this point with his comparison of the AT&T and Trinko cases, suggesting that antitrust and regulation should be viewed as complements rather than substitutes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

Introduction: Antitrust and the Dynamics of Competition in High-Tech Industries

Lenard¹

2011

Rev Ind Organ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

mentioning

confidence: 79%

Introduction: Antitrust and the Dynamics of Competition in High-Tech Industries

Lenard¹

2011

Rev Ind Organ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In a more recent example, AMD accused Intel of impeding its ability to compete through loyalty-rebates with PC manufacturers, but the substance of AMD's claim depends not on prior economic power in the chip market but on whether Intel came to dominate the market for PCs. 35 If AMD could place its chips with other manufacturers of PCs viewed favorably in the marketplace, or vertically integrate into PC production on its own, it could not be harmed. To put in terms of European Union practice, which Prof. Markovits also extensively critiques, the standard phrase ''abuse of dominance'' should be changed to ''abuse creating dominance.''…”

Section: Defining Exclusion: Prior Monopolymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ahead of His Time

Brennan

2016

The Antitrust Bulletin

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Prof. Markovits has been a prescient commenter on antitrust. His early and insightful characterization of the harm from merger as the loss to consumers from being able to trade off their two top choices can be seen in the use of diversion ratios in unilateral effects merger cases. So too does the change in assessing unilateral effects mergers from market concentration to direct measurement of competitive effects match his skepticism of market definition. I share Prof. Markovits's view that prior dominance should not be a prerequisite for monopolization cases, at least those involving exclusionary practices. I am skeptical that intent should play a role in monopolization, other than as a source of expert evidence that a practice will be harmful. Whether antitrust should be about maximizing consumer welfare or punishing powerful actors with bad intent may be a fundamental divide in perspective in the antitrust community.

show abstract

“…Relocation may have dislocation effects; other sections of this report describe the potential effects of relocation and high RE prices on U.S. labor markets.24 The theory of how a firm could exclude rivals from a market by monopolizing markets in complementary goods, such as inputs, is set out inBrennan (2007Brennan ( , 2008bBrennan ( , 2011.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%