High value forests, hidden economies and elite capture: Evidence from forest user groups in Nepal's Terai

Iversen, Vegard; Chhetry, Birka; Francis, Paul; Gurung, M.; Kafle, G.; Pain, Adam; Seeley, Janet

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.05.021

Cited by 150 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In most cases, both the elected and non-elected local elites decide how money is spent on a yearly basis or specific time. CBNRM thus, is about the devolution of power and ensuring that communities benefit (Araujo et al, 2005;Iversen et al, 2006;Saito-Jensen et al, 2010). A number of CBNRM programs were crafted in southern Africa's wildlife sector; in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Re-assertion of Elite Control in Masoka’s Wildlife Program, Zimbabwe

Muyengwa¹,

Child²

2017

JSD

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Local level governance is crucial in delivering benefits of conservation to communities. This paper provides a historical review of the evolution of governance and the emergence of elite capture in Masoka's wildlife program in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2011. Fifty-four key informant interviews and reviews of numerous secondary data sources analyzed in order to understand accountability mechanisms, collective decision-making, and the allocation of wildlife revenues into various local initiatives. The local narratives and secondary data suggested that the governance had flipped from one of impersonal and democratic rule to one based on personal rule of traditional leaders. These outcomes were in part a result of the shift in meso level structures that previously supported the program structures at community level, the shifting national politics that led to increased sense of enfranchisement and impunity among traditional leaders, and non-merit based system of appointing committee members. The results suggest that locally elected committees when left at the peril of strong and unchecked powers of traditional leaders they are bound to collapse. Second, the findings also indicate that in the absence of weak land tenure rights, locals have no "teeth" to challenge tradition-based authorities in order to demand for accountable governance. We conclude that given such condition of weak tenure and access to resource rights, local democratic institutions do not emerge naturally even if most people want them and if not protected from outside, they are bound to fail and superseded by personalized ones.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Re-assertion of Elite Control in Masoka’s Wildlife Program, Zimbabwe

Muyengwa¹,

Child²

2017

JSD

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“…These critiques argue that the participatory approach is often used as a ''Trojan horse'' (Blaikie 2006) by powerful actors, sometimes external but often local, leading to ''elite capture'' (Iversen et al 2006; see also Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2004) argue that ''sharing power'' is the key to sounder participatory management of natural resources, few studies have actually focused on how local people perceive such processes and how they influence institution building. This new approach stems from the authors' previous research highlighting the extreme limitations with regard to such approaches to participation.…”

Section: Pitfalls Of Participatory Approaches To Common Pool Resourcementioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

Haller

Acciaioli

Rist

2015

Society & Natural Resources

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“…Thus, bringing together multiple disciplines to study power within the SES framework compels researchers to engage explicitly with challenging and inevitable tradeoffs between critical and pragmatic approaches. Moreover, the emphasis on groups, broadly labeled resource users, likely overlooks a wide range of power relations within groups, most notably differential power between elite and non-elite members (Vedeld 2000 ;Iversen et al 2006 ;Mwangi 2006 ). Finally, it is clear that, while power exists implicitly in the SES framework, it is not given a prominent position; and if trends continue, the range of theorizing and studying power in the institutionalist tradition will remain overly narrow.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%