Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement

Kappel, Klemens

doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

Cited by 19 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…My characterization of deep disagreements differs from similar proposals by Michael Lynch (2010, and Chapter 10 this volume) and Klemens Kappel (2012Kappel ( , 2018.10 Both limit their account to disagreements involving fundamental epistemic principles, whereas I have included disagreements about relatively fundamental moral principles. My reason for doing so is that many real-life deep disagreements do not involve (only) factual issues but (also) moral values and principles.…”

Section: Disagreement: Ordinary and Deepmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…Broadening the characterization of deep disagreements in this way does introduce complications, since whether or not disagreements about normative moral principles can be treated in the same way as disagreements about normative epistemic principles depends partly on meta-ethics. For error-theoretical, relativist, or non-cognitivist views in meta-ethics, this is not the case because moral principles are not objectively true or false, or not even the sort of thing that can be true or false, or correct or incorrect.11 For simplicity's sake, I will assume that there are objective normative facts in both the moral and epistemic domain.12 Another difference with Lynch and Kappel is that both of them narrow the class of deep disagreements to those involving fundamental epistemic principles, which they understand as epistemic principles that can only be defended by epistemically 9 See Lynch (2010), Kappel (2012Kappel ( , 2018, Ranalli (2018a) for discussion and proposed answers. 10 It also differs from the Wittgensteinian theory of deep disagreements, according to which deep disagreements involve commitments to different hinge propositions.…”

Section: Disagreement: Ordinary and Deepmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

Ridder¹

2021

Political Epistemology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In deep disagreements, parties disagree about relatively fundamental underlying moral or epistemic principles and therefore see each other as less than fully rational or morally subpar. The chapter argues that deep disagreements lead to both cognitive and practical polarization, especially when they concern matters that are central to people’s social identities: deeply disagreeing parties will think less of each other and tend to treat each other worse. This, in turn, entrenches their disagreement even further, resulting in a vicious feedback loop. Support for the claims made here comes from both conceptual connections between deep disagreement and polarization as well as widely established empirical results in psychology and political science.

show abstract

Section: Disagreement: Ordinary and Deepmentioning

confidence: 77%

Section: Disagreement: Ordinary and Deepmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

Ridder¹

2021

Political Epistemology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Martin Ebeling (2017) argues that disagreement with an epistemic peer on a political question obligates one to conciliate with them, but if one finds that the dispute is more widespread than originally thought, that diminishes the requirement to conciliate in that situation (Ebeling 2017, 82). Klemens Kappel (2018) has also argued that while disagreements might usually provide some undefeated higher-order evidence that one has made some error, that evidence is not as strong in situations of thoroughgoing, deep disagreement (cf. Pittard 2019) Though deep disagreements might cause some epistemic angst about whether one has made a fundamental mistake or relying on a non-truthconducive principle (Kappel 2018: 11), their presence alone does not undercut the judgment that the other person has made some serious and fundamental errors.…”

Section: Scopementioning

confidence: 99%

Political Justificationism: A Casuistic Epistemology of Political Disagreement

Carlson¹

2020

Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, drawing on Jennifer Lackey's justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement's scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.

show abstract

“…Similarly, why should the disagreement with B make A doubt the propriety of her own practices? 20 For more on this conception of deep disagreement see (Lynch 2010(Lynch , 2016Kappel 2012Kappel , 2018.…”

Section: Deep Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Kappel 2018). 2 Note that the term 'conciliationism' is also used in a somewhat broader sense, denoting views stating that in peer disagreements one should reduce one's confidence in the disputed belief.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Kappel

Andersen

2019

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higherorder evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one's confidence with respect to the proposition in question. We term this the higher-order evidence account (the HOE account), and present it as superior to what we might call standard conciliationism, which holds that when agents A and B disagree about p, and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement about p or adjust their confidence towards the mean of A and B's prior credences in p. Many have suspected that standard conciliationism is implausible and may have skeptical implications. After presenting the HOE account, we put it to work by applying it to # We have presented this material at workshops in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. Thanks to audiences there for helpful comments, in particular Julien Dutant, Alexander Heape and participants in LVU18, Lisbon. 2 a range of cases of moral disagreement, including those that have featured in recent debates assuming standard conciliationism. We show that the HOE account support reasonable, non-skeptical verdicts in a range of cases. Note that this is a paper on moral disagreement, not on the HOE account, thus the account is merely stated here, while defended more fully elsewhere. 1

show abstract

Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement

Cited by 19 publications

References 6 publications

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

Deep Disagreements and Political Polarization

Political Justificationism: A Casuistic Epistemology of Political Disagreement

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About