Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction

Abstract

There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher-order evidence. The existing dilemmas can be defused by adopting a 'two-dimensional' representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first-order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher-order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such a two-dimensional representation is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities.

Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence

“…5 Whether, and to what extent, this kind of evidence should affect one’s doxastic attitude has been a matter of philosophical debate. A recent discussion by Henderson (2022) provides a helpful summary by distinguishing between “revise” and “level-splitting” views. According to the former, HOE merits a revision of both higher-order attitudes and first-order attitudes.…”

“… 6 A first-order attitude is a doxastic attitude toward first-order propositions, which are those that concern ordinary subject matter in the world. In contrast, higher-order attitudes are directed toward higher-order propositions, which concern the doxastic states or attitudes of an agent, including the relationship between evidence and an agent’s doxastic state (Henderson 2022, 3). …”

(Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence

“…Second upshot: several authors have argued that in the context of higher-order evidence, standard rational norms break down or run into dilemmas. Christensen (2007a) and Henderson (2021) argue that such cases tell against (precise) probabilism (cf. Elkin and Wheeler, 2018).…”

(Im)probable stories

“…I want to propose that we should instead understand the relationship between our first-and higher-order beliefs in terms of a full-belief framework -where we either believe something or not. Within such a framework, higher-order evidence is usually conceptualized as an undercutting defeater (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014;Henderson, 2021). An undercutting defeater casts doubt on the connection between the firstorder evidence and the belief concerning the first-order proposition.…”

“…There are various ways of spelling out this idea. For instance, Henderson (2021) mentions several characterizations that epistemologists have given of the concept, including 'evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter' (Christensen, 2016), 'evidence about what your evidence supports' (Sliwa & Horowitz, 2015) and evidence that 'induces doubts that one's doxastic state is the result of a flawed process' (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014). So, roughly speaking, higher-order evidence is evidence about how reliable the conclusions are that we drew from our first-order evidence.…”