“…A key idea that pervades discussions of consciousness is phenomenal experience. In the most general sense, so-called phenomenal consciousness is just the property of there being something that it is like for one, from one's point of view, to be in a particular state (81). When I consciously experience pain, or see red, there is something that it is like, and that something can only be known through experience.…”
Section: Consciousness In Contemporary Philosophy Cognitive Sciencementioning
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...
“…A key idea that pervades discussions of consciousness is phenomenal experience. In the most general sense, so-called phenomenal consciousness is just the property of there being something that it is like for one, from one's point of view, to be in a particular state (81). When I consciously experience pain, or see red, there is something that it is like, and that something can only be known through experience.…”
Section: Consciousness In Contemporary Philosophy Cognitive Sciencementioning
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...
“…But the exploration of this topic will have to await another occasion. Notes 1 -The literature on this subject is vast; on the higher-order-thought side, see, for example, Rosenthal 1986Rosenthal , 1993Rosenthal , 2005Carruthers 2011;Lau and Rosenthal 2011. On the same-order side, see esp.…”
“…There are different ways of spelling out the notion of “higher‐order cognition”, but all variants refer to certain higher‐order representations of first‐order mental states (for a comprehensive survey and discussion, see Carruthers ). A higher‐order representation of the relevant sort could be an agent's (or cognitive system's) perception of its first‐order mental states, for instance its perception that it has certain beliefs or desires.…”
Section: Some Illustrative Psycho‐physical Bridge Principles and Theimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, even if we set aside the question of why higher‐order cognition should be associated with phenomenal consciousness, a serious objection to such an account of consciousness is that it fails to vindicate the presence of consciousness in non‐human animals. As Carruthers () notes: Since there is considerable dispute as to whether even chimpanzees have the kind of sophisticated “theory of mind” to enable them to entertain thoughts about experiential states as such …, it seems most implausible that many other species of mammal (let alone reptiles, birds, and fish) would qualify as phenomenally conscious, on these accounts. Yet the intuition that such creatures enjoy phenomenally conscious experiences is a powerful and deep‐seated one, for many people.…”
Section: Some Illustrative Psycho‐physical Bridge Principles and Theimentioning
The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.
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