Historical epistemology of the body-mind interaction in psychiatry

Abstract

This paper deals with the history of the relationship between the mind-body dualism and the epistemology of madness. Earlier versions of such dualism posed little problem in regard to the manner of their communication. The Cartesian view that mind and body did, in fact, name different substances introduced a problem of incommunicability that is yet to be resolved. Earlier views that madness may be related to changes in the brain began gaining empirical support during the 17th century. Writers on madness chose to resolve the mind-body problem differently Some stated that such communication was not needed; others, that mind was a redundant concept, as madness could be fully explained by structural changes in the brain; and yet others described psychological spaces for madness to inhabit as a symbolic conflict. The epistemology of the neurosciences bypasses the conundrum, as it processes all together the variables representing the brain, subjectivity, and behavior and bridges the “philosophical” gap by means of correlational structures.

A ‘Systemic’ Model of a Mind-Body Interaction

“…DOI: 10.59324/ejtas.2024.2(1).17 system, such as a human being or a machine, does not depend on what it is composed of (neurons or chips), but on how its components are organised. According to this approach, a mental state would be defined by its causal relationships with other mental states (Berrios, 2018).…”

Understanding understanding in psychiatry

“…It does not, however, justify its uptake. The idea of a mind–body problem is extremely nebulous (see Berrios, 2018 ; Pernu, 2017 ), 6 arguably illicitly lumping together several importantly distinct issues (see Rorty, 1982 ). One worry here, expressed by Gough (2021) , is that the mind–body problem is an unhelpful idea in psychiatry, and that psychiatry ought to take an attitude of ‘naïve naturalism’ towards the mental (see Hornsby, 1980 , 2001 ; see also: Berrios, 2018 ; Kendler, 2012 ).…”

The Mind-Body Problem in the Context of Neuropsychiatric Symptoms in Patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019

“…For instance, the first scientific laboratory of experimental psychology in Leipzig, founded by W. Wundt, posed the problem of human consciousness within the framework of the fourth Cartesian proposition: physical and nonphysical things cannot interact. 2 Paying attention to its physiological nature, consciousness’s psychic phenomenon was evaluated solely as a mental process. 3 Another prominent scientist of that period who founded the world’s second experimental psychology laboratory in Kazan was V. Bekhterev.…”