Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero‐sum Games in the State of Nature

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between "moderates" and "dominators" and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. However, the "state of war" ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist.

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

“…The history of the application of game theory to Hobbes' studies is long (Gauthier, : esp. 76 ff; Hampton, ; Kavka, ), and still ongoing (Eggers, ; Moehler, ), despite the vociferous criticism it has elicited (Neal, ; Ewin, ; Lloyd, ). I will not examine the entirety of this literature—much the less the broader ‘orthodox interpretation’ of Hobbes as the philosopher of self‐interested contractarianism (Gaus, )—which would be far too much for this paper, but only a small section of it: the discussion of the exit from the state of nature, and more specifically Hobbes' answer to the ‘foole’ (Hobbes, : XV.4–5; Zaitchik, ; Hampton, ; Kavka, ; Hoekstra, ).…”

“…Having established the point, Pasquino proceeds with his argument about how Hobbes tried to restructure the incentives to obey the sovereign in the civil state, against the preferences' framework resulting from prevailing religious world‐views (Pasquino, : 412 ff) . On this account, the question of leaving the natural state loses its relevance: it could happen by chance, coercion, or even for irrational motives (Eggers, : 197–198). The important thing is that the arguments to support an already established sovereign are correct, and convincing for the subjects to boot.…”

“…There is an important difference between the Leviathan and earlier expositions of Hobbes' civil science; in the former the natural state of war is not presented as contradictory to reason: (Magri, 1994: 28-31). 22 Weaker game-theoretical interpretations may be limited in their scope of application (Eggers, 2011) or introduce constraints to instrumental rationality (Moehler, 2012). 23 Some even read Hobbes as a precursor of Luhmann (Zolo, 2011).…”

“…Weaker game‐theoretical interpretations may be limited in their scope of application (Eggers, ) or introduce constraints to instrumental rationality (Moehler, ).…”

The Coming Breakthrough in Risk Research

“…In a way it started in the 17 th century with the work of Thomas Hobbes, who introduced many ideas that later led to game theory (Eggers, 2011). One of the most important ideas of the rational actor paradigm is the strict separation of facts and values, that later led to the idea of exogenously given utility functions (Read, 2004).…”