Hobbes and the Foole

Hoekstra, Kinch

doi:10.1177/0090591797025005002

Cited by 80 publications

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“…76 ff; Hampton, ; Kavka, ), and still ongoing (Eggers, ; Moehler, ), despite the vociferous criticism it has elicited (Neal, ; Ewin, ; Lloyd, ). I will not examine the entirety of this literature—much the less the broader ‘orthodox interpretation’ of Hobbes as the philosopher of self‐interested contractarianism (Gaus, )—which would be far too much for this paper, but only a small section of it: the discussion of the exit from the state of nature, and more specifically Hobbes' answer to the ‘foole’ (Hobbes, : XV.4–5; Zaitchik, ; Hampton, ; Kavka, ; Hoekstra, ). The arguments advanced by these studies have been, on their own terms, decisively refuted by Pasquale Pasquino (Pasquino, ); yet they remain useful, ex negativo , to better understand the limits of consequentialism within Hobbes' framework.…”

Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Parietti

2017

European J of Philosophy

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Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.

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Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Parietti

2017

European J of Philosophy

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“…Hoekstra notes that the English "fool" comes from the Latin follis, meaning "a bellows or windbag," the loud mouth who, not content to think seditious thoughts, dares to utter them. 12 A "windbag" fits with Hobbes's depiction of Pericles in De cive v.5, who thundered his way up and down Greece, proof that "the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition." 13 It similarly fits with Hobbes's distaste for democracy and the ecclesia as "a talking shop," a view shared by some Greeks, including Thucydides; as it fits with Hobbes's endorsement of Sallust's judgment of Catiline, De coniuratione Catilinae 5.4: "satis eloquentia, sapientiae parum," which Hobbes quotes in The Elements xxvii, 13, and again paraphrases in De cive xii, 12, declaring that "there can be no author of rebellion, that is not an eloquent and powerful speaker, and withal .…”

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“…a man of little wisdom." 14 Hoekstra is right that the fool's error is no mere sin of omission-his failure to acknowledge justice-it is rather a sin of commission: "the Foole's doctrine is presented as something that the Foole seriously alleges." 15 He is, moreover, more than merely an "Explicit Foole," and rather "the Flagrant Foole [who] flouts justice so blatantly that his actions themselves speak loudly, serving as a declaration that he believes that one can reasonably act unjustly."…”

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Hobbes’s Fool the Insipiens, and the Tyrant-King

Springborg

2010

Political Theory

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Hobbes in Leviathan, chapter xv, 4, makes the startling claim: “The fool hath said in his heart, ‘there is no such thing as justice,’” paraphrasing Psalm 52:1: “The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.” These are charges of which Hobbes himself could stand accused. His parable of the fool is about the exchange of obedience for protection, the backslider, regime change, and the tyrant; but given that Hobbes was himself likely an oath-breaker, it is also self-reflexive and self-justificatory. For, Hobbes’s fool is not a windbag ( follis), or one of the dumb mob, led astray by priests ( stultus). He is, in the terminology of Psalm 52, an insipiens, a madman or raving lunatic, whose rebellion against God the King is his own destruction and that of his people. A long iconographic tradition portraying the fool as insipiens, Antichrist, heretical impostor and tyrant king, was at Hobbes’s disposal.

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“…Remember that the Foole's position is that covenant-breaking can be unjust, but not against reason if it conduces to the agent's benefit. Kinch Hoekstra (1997) has attributed this position to Hobbes himself. But Hobbes says that justice (which consists in keeping covenants) signifies "conformity or inconformity to reason…of particular actions (L:xv/10), and that "law can never be against reason" (L:xxvi/7).…”

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Hobbes and Normative Egoism

Worsnip

2015

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent's normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers 'yes'. In an important recent work, however, S.A. Lloyd has argued that the answer to the question is 'no', and built an alternative nonegoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original 'middle way' interpretation of Hobbes which steers a course between an excessively egoistic and what we might call an excessively 'moralistic' interpretation. According to the interpretation I defend, our obligations have their source in self-interest in the sense that they are all self-assumed results of covenants, our reasons for making which are solely self-interested. But the obligations that result from such covenants can sometimes require us to act against our self-interest.Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent's normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers 'yes'. Within this tradition, the interpretative game has been to show how adherence to Hobbesian morality can be justified on purely egoistic grounds. In an important recent work, however, S.A. Lloyd (2009) has argued that the answer to the question is 'no'. Lloyd builds an alternative non-egoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability.My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original 'middle way' interpretation of Hobbes which steers a course between an excessively egoistic and what we might call an excessively 'moralistic' interpretation.1 On my view, the answer to our central question depends on what we mean by 'grounded in her own good'. Briefly, the view I attribute to Hobbes is this: our moral obligations are all self-assumed results of covenants, our reasons for making which are solely selfinterested. But the obligations that result from such covenants can sometimes require us -and give us reason to -act against our self-interest.2 So, such obligations are grounded in an agent's own I am grateful for comments from and/or discussions with

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Hobbes and the Foole

Abstract: Answere not a foole according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him. Answere a foole according to his folly, lest hee be wise in his owne conceit. Proverbs 26:4-5

Cited by 80 publications

References 3 publications

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Hobbes’s Fool the Insipiens, and the Tyrant-King

Hobbes and Normative Egoism

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