Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil

Birmingham, Peg

doi:10.2979/hyp.2003.18.1.80

Cited by 2 publications

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“…However, within this position, there are those who see some localized incompatibility with regard to the account of motivation (such as Bernstein and Henry Allison), 2 and those who see the two concepts as intimately related and not at all in contradiction with each other (such as Peg Birmingham). 3 Others, such as Wayne Allen, seem to fall somewhere in between. 4 The second, forwarded initially by Gershom Scholem (and arguably by Arendt herself) and recently updated by Dana Villa, 5 sees the two concepts as inherently incompatible.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is radical evil banal? Is banal evil radical?

Formosa

2007

Philosophy & Social Criticism

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There has been much recent debate concerning how Hannah Arendt's concepts of radical evil and the banality of evil `fit together', if at all. I argue that the first of these concepts deals with a certain type of evil, in particular the evil that occurred in the Nazi death camps. The second deals with a certain type of perpetrator of evil, in particular the banal `nobody', Eichmann. As such, bar a localized incompatibility in regard to Arendt's early account of the motivation of perpetrators of radical evil, these two concepts are independent but nonetheless highly complementary.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is radical evil banal? Is banal evil radical?

Formosa

2007

Philosophy & Social Criticism

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“…For James Phillips, however, this ‘succeeds in resolving the conflict between radical and banal evil…[but] does not succeed in clarifying why Arendt explicitly says to Scholem that she changed her mind’ (Phillips, 2004: 132). In response, both Phillips and Peg Birmingham (2003) argue that it was to develop a strategy to overcome political totalitarianism, although they disagree on a number of specifics. Phillips recognizes that while evil was historically opposed to the good, totalitarianism was based on a radical evil that was so total that it left ‘nothing behind, no trace that could be taken up and work[ed] through dialectically’ (Phillips, 2004: 133).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Her later report on the trial of Eichmann…further elucidates this banality, but does not in any way refute or alter what she has argued in the earlier work. (Birmingham, 2003: 81)From this, Birmingham appeals to Arendt’s notion of natality to argue that it offers ‘the only possible remedy to the threat of radical evil by modifying our relationship to temporality, which in turn allows for a transformed sense of the “solidarity of humanity” through the affective bond of political friendship’ (ibid. : 82).…”

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Hannah Arendt, evil, and political resistance

Rae

2019

History of the Human Sciences

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While Hannah Arendt claimed to have abandoned her early conception of radical evil for a banal one, recent scholarship has questioned that conclusion. This article contributes to the debate by arguing that her conceptual alteration is best understood by engaging with the structure of norms subtending each conception. From this, I develop a compatibilist understanding that accounts for Arendt’s movement from a radical to a banal conception of evil, by claiming that it was because she came to reject the foundationalism of the former for the non-foundationalism of the latter, where norms are located from an ineffable ‘source’ diffusely spread throughout the society. While it might be thought that this means that such norms are all-encompassing to the extent that they determine individual action, I appeal to her notions of plurality, action, and natality, to argue that she defends the weaker claim that moral norms merely condition action. This demonstrates how Arendt’s conceptions of evil complement one another, highlights her understanding of the action–norms relation, and identifies that there is built into Arendt’s conception(s) of evil a resource for resisting totalitarian domination.

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Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Is radical evil banal? Is banal evil radical?

Is radical evil banal? Is banal evil radical?

Hannah Arendt, evil, and political resistance

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