Structural Realism (SR) is a moderate variant of scientific realism and can roughly be captured by the idea that we should be committed in the structural rather than object-like content of our best current scientific theories. A quick view on the list of some of the main proponents shows that SR is basically a European philosophy of science movement (and just suits our ESF Programme): John Worrall, Ioannis Votsis, Steven French, Angelo Cei, James Ladyman, Simon Saunders, Michael Esfeld, Vincent Lam, Katherine Brading, Mauro Dorato, Dean Rickles, Fred Muller, and -exceptions prove the rule -Anjan Chakravartty and John Stachel. The list is of course not exhaustive, moreover, the debate has a broad periphery. A notable example is for instance Bas van Fraassen's structural empiricism.The paper is a kind of opinionated review paper. In what follows I will pass through the most prevailing topics in recent debates over SR. My discussion will be organised, perhaps a bit unorthodoxly, in short sections, here and then I will outline my own views.
The notion of structureThe notion of structure is notoriously vague, and this is already one of the many problems of SR. The notion is of course not vague as far as the abstract mathematical concept of structure is concerned. Compare, for instance, Shapiro (2000): "Define a system to be a collection of objects with certain relations among them. [...] Define a pattern or structure to be the abstract form of the system, highlighting the interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the system." The mathematical definition has it that there are entities, the relata, that come equipped with a structure, but that the relata are determined by structural or relational properties only. Hence, a good working definition for SR is that structures are sets of objects, domains, with sets of relations imposed on them.