Homothetic preferences and aggregation

Chipman, John S.

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90003-9

Cited by 147 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…For the incomplete markets model aggregation in the case of homothetic and identical preferences has been shown by Hens (1990) and by Detemple and Gottardi (1998), generalizing the theorems of Antonelli (1886) and of Gorman (1953), respectively. The case of homothetic preferences and colinear endowments has been proved for the incomplete markets model by Voß (1997), who generalizes a result of Chipman (1974).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

An Extension of Mantel (1976) to Incomplete Markets

Hens

2001

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

An Extension of Mantel (1976) to Incomplete Markets

Hens

2001

SSRN Journal

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“…The fact that ES and CCE do not coincide is interesting: in the non constrained context, the competitive solution can be computed by maximizing the Nash product, solving what is known as the Eisenberg-Gale program (Eisenberg, 1961;Eisenberg and Gale, 1959;Chipman, 1974, see chapter 7 in Moulin (2003 for a textbook treatment or Sobel (2009) for a brief overview). That the competitive solution cannot be computed solving the Eisenberg-Gale program implies that we lack an algorithm for computing the competitive equilibrium, which can be a hard task (Uzawa, 1962;Othman et al, 2010Othman et al, , 2014.…”

Section: Two Examples Showing That All the Solutions Differmentioning

confidence: 99%

Random Multi-Unit Assignment with Endogenous Quotas

Ortega

2017

SSRN Journal

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We study the random multi-unit assignment problem in which the number of goods to be distributed depends on players' preferences.In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and impossible to manipulate by groups when agents have dichotomous preferences.Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.Two standard results disappear. The competitive solution can no longer be computed with the Eisenberg-Gale program maximizing the Nash product, and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is no longer unique in its corresponding utility profile.

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“…Often aggregation questions are posed when the microvariables X have a fixed distribution relative to varying means of X (see Chipman (1974) …”

Section: "Fixed Distributions' and Homogeneous Functionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We will also consider the subclasses CC defined by C = {F (X)CHA = }, the functions homogeneous of degree X. These families are identical when M = 1, which is the case studied by Chipman (1974).…”

Section: Among Others)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Completeness, Distribution Restrictions, and the Form of Aggregate Functions

Stoker¹

1984

Econometrica

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This paper presents the problem of aggregation over individual agents as a basic identification problem inherent to interpreting relationships between averaged economic variables. The concept of a complete aggregation structure is introduced, which embodies the correct condition for identification. Several examples of complete aggregation structures are provided by previous work on the aggregation problem in economics. Examples are also provided by work on complete distribution families in statistics, which in turn provide the correct conceptual framework for developing a theory of parameter estimation and tests of specific aggregation assumptions. The potential lack of correspondence between microeconomic behavior and estimated relations between averaged data is illustrated by distribution families obeying linear probability movement, which induce an extreme failure of the completeness property. Certain topics regarding empirical applications of aggregation results are reviewed.

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Homothetic preferences and aggregation

Cited by 147 publications

References 12 publications

An Extension of Mantel (1976) to Incomplete Markets

An Extension of Mantel (1976) to Incomplete Markets

Random Multi-Unit Assignment with Endogenous Quotas

Completeness, Distribution Restrictions, and the Form of Aggregate Functions

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