Honesty and inquiry: W.K. Clifford’s ethics of belief

Nottelmann, Nikolaj; Fessenbecker, Patrick

doi:10.1080/09608788.2019.1655389

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…While it is reasonable to regard the argument in 'The Ethics of Belief' as a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument, it has recently been claimed that Clifford's conclusion is merely a 'rhetorical flourish' (Nottelmann and Fessenbecker 2019). It is an unconvincing contention because, asserting that Clifford was really discussing blameworthiness, its proponents rely not on an interpretation of his arguments but on his supporting examples, concentrate on a subset of the examples without justifying the selection, and, despite having selected the examples for discussion, still have to discount some of them to save their hypothesis.…”

Section: Clifford Qua Act Utilitarianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clifford's Consequentialism

Zamulinski

2022

Utilitas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is morally negligent or reckless to believe without sufficient evidence. The foregoing proposition follows from a rule that is a modified expression of W. K. Clifford's ethics of belief. Clifford attempted to prove that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence by advancing a doxastic counterpart to an act utilitarian argument. Contrary to various commentators, his argument is neither purely nor primarily epistemic, he is not a non-consequentialist, and he does not use stoicism to make his case. Clifford's conclusion is a universal generalisation that is in a precarious position because of potential counterexamples. But the counterexamples do not preclude a rule against going beyond the available evidence and it is worthwhile making a moral case for such a rule.

show abstract

Section: Clifford Qua Act Utilitarianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Clifford's Consequentialism

Zamulinski

2022

Utilitas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Zasada Clifforda wskazuje natomiast, w jaki sposób prawidłowo usunąć ten stan, by nie wytworzyć szkodliwego nadprzekonania. Jednocześnie, choć wywody Clifforda sugerują niejednokrotnie, że zdolność do poprawnego reagowania na tego rodzaju doksastyczne stany drażniące, stanowi zaletę charakteru (cnotę), co nasuwa skojarzenia z etyką cnót (NOTTELMANN i FESSENBECKER 2020), to jest to cnota, którą każdy może wypracować. W przeciwnym razie jego uniwersalne twierdzenie o tym, że każdy odpowiada za swoje niedostatecznie uzasadnione przekonania, należałoby jakoś zmitygować.…”

Section: Pragmatyzm Tezy Cliffordaunclassified

Pragmatyczny wymiar tak zwanej tezy Clifforda

Dyrda

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Celem artykułu jest analiza etycznej wersji ewidencjalizmu XIX-wiecznego matematyka i filozofa W.K. Clifforda i obrona go przed zarzutami formułowanymi przez pragmatystów. Znana teza Clifforda brzmi: „Zawsze, wszędzie i bez względu na osobę niesłusznie jest żywić przekonania oparte na niedostatecznym świadectwie”. Argumentacja Clifforda na rzecz tej tezy, wpisująca się zasadniczo w XIX-wieczny program pozytywistycznej epistemologii, świadomie uwzględniała elementy pragmatyczne, wykluczające jej przesadnie radykalne odczytanie i krytykę. Okazuje się też, że współczesne koncepcje pragmatyczne właściwie wspierają normatywne intuicje, kryjące się za programem „etyki przekonań”, zaproponowanym przez Clifforda prawie 150 lat temu. Te ostatnie obejmują twierdzenie o normatywnych-etycznych podstawach epistemologii.

show abstract

“…91-2). For a recent interpretation of that essay and Clifford's general views on intellectual virtue seeNottelmann and Fessenbecker 2020.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Normative Defeat

Nottelmann

2021

Mind

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Several epistemologists have advanced the idea that a subject’s epistemic status can be weakened by evidence she does not possess but should have possessed, or, alternatively, by beliefs or doubts she should have had under her evidential circumstances but does not have. This alleged phenomenon is known as normative defeat and its adherents have typically reported intuitions that it obtains under mundane circumstances. Some epistemologists have analyzed normative defeat in terms of breached epistemic obligations, while others have preferred an analysis in terms of cognitive malfunctioning. No matter which analysis one prefers, I here argue that - given plausible psychological and epistemological assumptions - if the normative defeat phenomenon were real it would be more bizarre than is generally recognized. I conclude that alleged cases of normatively defeated knowledge or epistemic justification are better analyzed as cases of lucky or undeserved knowledge or epistemic justification.

show abstract

Honesty and inquiry: W.K. Clifford’s ethics of belief

Cited by 5 publications

References 9 publications

Clifford's Consequentialism

Clifford's Consequentialism

Pragmatyczny wymiar tak zwanej tezy Clifforda

Against Normative Defeat

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About