Honoraires d'audit et comités d'audit : le cas de la France

Broye, Géraldine

doi:10.3917/cca.151.0199

Cited by 28 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…According to Table 2, Panel A average audit fees are 5.09 M€ (median: 1.30) over the period (2006)(2007)(2008). This average amount is consistent with previous literature (mean: 4.45 M€ (median: 1.38 M€) for Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt (2007) on the SBF 250 index in 2002, and mean: 4.8 M€ for Broye (2009) on the Eurolist in 2005). We observe a wide diversity with a minimum of 0.02 M€ and a maximum of 52.50 M€.…”

Section: Data Collectionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Audit Pricing and Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from France

Ali

Lesage

2012

SSRN Journal

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Section: Data Collectionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Audit Pricing and Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from France

Ali

Lesage

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…In her major study, Broye (2009) claims that a positive association between the existence of an audit' committee and audit fees' level. Previous studies have reported a positive and significant association between audit committee independence and audit fees' level (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003;Chen, Duh, & Shiue, 2008;Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006).…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Audit Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Book‐Tax Differences, Corporate Governance Effectiveness and Audit Quality: An Interactive Effects

Riguen¹,

Kachouri²,

Jarboui³

2018

J Corp Accounting Finance

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In this article, we aim to answer the important questions of whether the corporate governance effectiveness affects the relationship between book‐tax differences (BTDs) and audit quality. We also aim to determine whether the variability between BTDs and audit quality is moderated by corporate governance index (CGI). The primary aim of the present study is to contribute to improving the existence of an interaction between BTDs, audit quality, and CGI. This study uses a sample of 28 nonfinancial listed Tunisian companies and covers an eight‐year period from 2005 to 2015. To test the hypotheses of this research, a generalized least squares (GLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was applied. The results obtained show that, for the Tunisian companies, a positive association between BTDs and audit quality. The current study also provides evidence that corporate governance moderates the relationship between BTDs and audit quality. The findings may be of interest to the academic researchers, practitioners and regulators who are interested in discovering the quality of corporate governance practices and tax practices in Tunisian context. The findings of this study can help Tunisian regulators in creating corporate governance disclosure requirements. The findings also provide the African business community insights concerning audit quality, tax practices, and corporate governance. This article extends the existing literature, by examining the inter‐relationship between corporate governance, BTDs, and audit quality. © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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“…A possible reason for this result may relates to the complementary effect between the internal and the external audit as two governance mechanisms (Goodwin‐Stewart and Kent, ). The positive variability of the IAFHELP's variable highlights that a corporate demand has the effect of limiting agency costs that result from conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Broye, ). Consistent with Panel B Exhibit , the highest correlation is equal to 0.5578.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The internal auditor contributes to the audit of financial statements as an assistant who works under the direct supervision of the external auditor. When the internal auditor is significantly involved in strengthening the internal control, the external auditor reliance on the client's internal control will increase and the external auditor's fees decrease (AICPA, 1997;Broye, 2009;Felix et al, 2001;PCAOB, 2010). Felix et al (2001) found that the external auditor's confidence on the IA work is influenced by his perception of the quality of the IAF as well as, conditioned by the level of inherent risk.…”

Section: Quality Of the Iafmentioning

confidence: 99%

Some evidence on the impact of internal audit on external audit fees

Hazami‐Ammar

2019

J Corp Accounting Finance

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We examine responses of 2,160 internal auditors to a global survey of the internal auditing profession carried out by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation from 2009 to 2013. We found that when the internal audit function's (IAF's) quality is high, the external audit fees will be low. This result confirms the substitution effect. We also found that when internal audit hours work increase, audit fees will be high; indicating a complementary effect between these variables. The internal auditor can be the external audit assistant and fully engaged in specific monitoring and control tasks. Nevertheless, he also may be an independent partner of an external audit and fully engaged in corporate governance. If the external auditor apprehends that audit risk is low due to the quality of the IAF, he will require lower fees. If the IAF's work devoted to external audit is high, a signal of a great firm commitment in reinforcing corporate governance is transmitted. Such signal proves the company's willingness to invest more in improving the external audit quality and fees will be high.

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Honoraires d'audit et comités d'audit : le cas de la France

Cited by 28 publications

References 32 publications

Audit Pricing and Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from France

Audit Pricing and Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence from France

Book‐Tax Differences, Corporate Governance Effectiveness and Audit Quality: An Interactive Effects

Some evidence on the impact of internal audit on external audit fees

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