Hopping, skipping or jumping to conclusions? Clarifying the role of the JTC bias in delusions

Fine, Cordelia; Gardner, Mark; Craigie, Jillian; Gold, Ian

doi:10.1080/13546800600750597

Cited by 283 publications

(238 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Indeed, the regression analysis showed that depression was the variable that best predicts delusional ideation and explains the most variance. However, in both cases, these findings are in accordance with the relative null effect that emotional valence has on JTC (for a review, see Fine et al, 2007).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

“…However, they did not display a hasty decision making in their change of mind, suggesting that delusions may not be associated with a tendency to jump to new conclusions, but rather with a tendency to change conclusions. The concept of jumping to new conclusions has been considered with reservation (Fine et al, 2007) as it is often regarded as being at odds with an element of the usual definition of delusions: that they are "fixed false beliefs" (Sadock and Sadock, 2003). However, if people with delusions and people with delusional ideation jump to one conclusion, it had to be tested whether they jump again to another conclusion as quickly.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Delusional thinking has been the focus of many investigations and theoretical formulations in recent years (for reviews, see Garety and Hemsley, 1994;Bentall and Kinderman, 1998;Garety and Freeman, 1999;Bentall et al, 2001;Fine et al, 2007;Freeman, 2007). Compelling evidence suggests that people with delusional thinking have both a distinct reasoning style and a more affective symptomatology than people without delusions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, they tend to draw conclusions based on less evidence than nondelusional participants (e.g., Huq et al, 1988;Garety et al, 1991;Garety et al, 2005;van Dael et al, 2006;Langdon et al, 2010; for a review see Fine et al, 2007). Even though the conclusions reached in the typical jump to conclusions paradigm are not of delusional content, such a mechanism of hasty decision-making can help explain why someone could consider a false belief in the first place (Ziegler et al, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Rodier

Prévost

Renoult

et al. 2011

Psychiatry Research

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Emotional distress and reasoning biases are two factors known to contribute to delusions. As a step towards elucidating mechanisms underlying delusions, the main aim of this study was to evaluate a possible "jumping to new conclusions" reasoning bias in healthy people with delusional ideation and its association with emotions. We surveyed 80 healthy participants, measuring levels of depression, anxiety, cognitive error and delusional ideation. Participants completed two versions of the beads task to evaluate their reasoning style. Results showed that people with delusional ideation reached a conclusion after less information, as expected. Interestingly, they also tended to change their conclusions more often than people without delusional ideation and did so with greater conviction. Depression and cognitive errors were strong predictors of delusional ideation but not of reasoning style. We conclude that delusional ideation in non-psychotic individuals is independently predicted by depressive symptoms and by a high conviction in new conclusions.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Rodier

Prévost

Renoult

et al. 2011

Psychiatry Research

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“…characteristic of patients prone to severe pathology. This link between changes in cognition and changes in symptom severity has been demonstrated with the jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias (Woodward et al 2009;Sanford et al 2013), a distinct but related cognitive process thought to be associated with delusions (Garety et al 1991;Fine et al 2007;Freeman et al 2008;Speechley et al 2010;Menon et al 2013).…”

Section: Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Impaired integration of disambiguating evidence in delusional schizophrenia patients

et al. 2014

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Background. It has been previously demonstrated that a cognitive bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) is associated with delusions. However, small samples of delusional patients, reliance on difference scores and choice of comparison groups may have hampered the reliability of these results. In the present study we aimed to improve on this methodology with a recent version of the BADE task, and compare larger groups of schizophrenia patients with/without delusions to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, a population with persistent and possibly bizarre beliefs without psychosis.Method. A component analysis was used to identify cognitive operations underlying the BADE task, and how they differ across four groups of participants: (1) high-delusional schizophrenia, (2) low-delusional schizophrenia, (3) OCD patients and (4) non-psychiatric controls.Results. As in past studies, two components emerged and were labelled 'evidence integration' (the degree to which disambiguating information has been integrated) and 'conservatism' (reduced willingness to provide high plausibility ratings when justified), and only evidence integration differed between severely delusional patients and the other groups, reflecting delusional subjects giving higher ratings for disconfirmed interpretations and lower ratings for confirmed interpretations.Conclusions. These data support the finding that a reduced willingness to adjust beliefs when confronted with disconfirming evidence may be a cognitive underpinning of delusions specifically, rather than obsessive beliefs or other aspects of psychosis such as hallucinations, and illustrates a cognitive process that may underlie maintenance of delusions in the face of counter-evidence. This supports the possibility of the BADE operation being a useful target in cognitive-based therapies for delusions.

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Sustained and “Sleeper” Effects of Group Metacognitive Training for Schizophrenia

et al. 2014

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IMPORTANCE Cognitive interventions increasingly complement psychopharmacological treatment to enhance symptomatic and functional outcome in schizophrenia. Metacognitive training (MCT) is targeted at cognitive biases involved in the pathogenesis of delusions.OBJECTIVE To examine the long-term efficacy of group MCT for schizophrenia in order to explore whether previously established effects were sustained. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTSA 2-center, randomized, controlled, assessor-blind, parallel group trial was conducted. A total of 150 inpatients or outpatients with DSM-IV diagnoses of schizophrenia spectrum disorders were enrolled. All patients were prescribed antipsychotic medication. The second follow-up assessment took place 3 years later after the intervention phase was terminated. INTERVENTIONS Group MCT targeting cognitive biases vs neuropsychological training (COGPACK).Patients received a maximum of 16 sessions. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURESThe primary outcome measure was a delusion score derived from the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). The PANSS positive syndrome and total scores, the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales, the jumping to conclusions bias, self-esteem, and quality of life served as secondary outcome measures. RESULTSThe intention-to-treat analyses demonstrated that patients in the MCT group had significantly greater reductions in the core PANSS delusion score, after 3 years compared with the control group (η 2 partial = .037; P = .05). Among the secondary outcomes, the intention-to-treat analyses also demonstrated that patients in the MCT group had significantly greater reductions in the PANSS positive syndrome score (η 2 partial = .055; P = .02) and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales delusion score (η 2 partial = .109; P = .001). Significant group differences at the 3-year follow-up were also found on measures of self-esteem and quality of life, which did not distinguish groups at earlier assessment points. Attention was improved in the neuropsychological training group relative to the MCT group. The completion rate was 61.3% after 3 years. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCEMetacognitive training demonstrated sustained effects in the reduction of delusions, which were over and above the effects of antipsychotic medication. Moreover, there were some unanticipated ("sleeper") effects as both self-esteem and quality of life were improved after 3 years. Effects on self-esteem and well-being were found even in the absence of an improvement on the jumping to conclusions bias.

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Hopping, skipping or jumping to conclusions? Clarifying the role of the JTC bias in delusions

Cited by 283 publications

References 48 publications

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Healthy people with delusional ideation change their mind with conviction

Impaired integration of disambiguating evidence in delusional schizophrenia patients

Sustained and “Sleeper” Effects of Group Metacognitive Training for Schizophrenia

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