We thank numerous seminar participants and discussants for useful comments. In particular, we are grateful to
ABSTRACTWe build a model of the U.S. economy with multiple aggregate shocks (income, housing finance conditions, and beliefs about future housing demand) that generate fluctuations in equilibrium house prices. Through a series of counterfactual experiments, we study the housing boom and bust around the Great Recession and obtain three main results. First, we find that the main driver of movements in house prices and rents was a shift in beliefs. Shifts in credit conditions do not move house prices but are important for the dynamics of home ownership, leverage, and foreclosures. The role of housing rental markets and long-term mortgages in alleviating credit constraints is central to these findings. Second, our model suggests that the boom-bust in house prices explains half of the corresponding swings in non-durable expenditures and that the transmission mechanism is a wealth effect through household balance sheets. Third, we find that a large-scale debt forgiveness program would have done little to temper the collapse of house prices and expenditures, but would have dramatically reduced foreclosures and induced a small, but persistent, increase in consumption during the recovery.3 It follows that, if foreclosure had very large externalities on house prices (which is not the case in our model), the principal reduction program might have a larger effect on prices. The empirical literature mostly estimates economically small and extremely localized effects (Anenberg and Kung, 2014;Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen, and Yao, 2015). See, however, Guren and McQuade (2015) for an alternative view. 4 In either case, it is essential that the shock is to future housing preferences or buildable land, rather than current housing preferences or buildable land. Otherwise, consumption or residential investment, respectively, would counterfactually fall during the boom and rise during the bust.