Household Cooperation in Waste Management: Initial Conditions and Intervention

Briguglio, Marie

doi:10.1002/9781119328223.ch6

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 165 publications

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“…The results survived these tests. The fact that the results on the other, more established determinants of recycling cooperation (namely household constraints, enabling scheme attributes and pro-envrionmental motives) support those in the environmental economics literature (Briguglio 2016), lends greater confidence to the more novel findings of our study, namely those pertaining to partisanship.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 69%

“…Voluntary contribution in public-good schemes is a phenomenon that is attracting increasing interest in economic literature (Guttman andGoette 2015, Guttman 2013), particularly given the (political, legislative and administrative) constraints of employing financial dis/incentives (Briguglio 2016). The findings of this study shed light on a determinant of voluntary cooperation which is quite distinct from other motives discussed in the literature to date.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…Within the broad literature on household cooperation in public-good schemes, recycling participation has drawn considerable scholarly attention. This not only reflects policy-makers' concern with ever increasing volumes of household waste and its associated environmental impacts (Briguglio 2016;OECD 2008), but also the availability of rich data, capable of offering valuable lessons for other public-good domains (Kinnaman and Takeuchi 2014). Much like behaviour in other public-good domains, recycling requires households to utilise private resources, but its benefits (such as the diversion of waste from landfill and reduction of harmful emissions) are public, enjoyed collectively by all members of society (Briguglio 2016).…”

Section: Household Cooperation In Public-good Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This not only reflects policy-makers' concern with ever increasing volumes of household waste and its associated environmental impacts (Briguglio 2016;OECD 2008), but also the availability of rich data, capable of offering valuable lessons for other public-good domains (Kinnaman and Takeuchi 2014). Much like behaviour in other public-good domains, recycling requires households to utilise private resources, but its benefits (such as the diversion of waste from landfill and reduction of harmful emissions) are public, enjoyed collectively by all members of society (Briguglio 2016). In scenarios like this, economic models built on the assumption of purely self-interested agents predict little voluntary contribution -such agents would opt to free-ride on the efforts of others (Baumol and Oates 1988).…”

Section: Household Cooperation In Public-good Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisanship, priming and participation in public-good schemes

Briguglio

Delaney

Wood

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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This study tests whether psychological attachment to a political party influences voluntary participation in a government-promoted public-good scheme, positing that cooperation is higher among households that identify with the party in government and lower among households that identify with the party in opposition. The focus is participation in a voluntary recycling scheme, in the context of a European country (Malta) where two parties dominate the political landscape. A nationally-representative survey (n = 1,037), yielded information on recycling participation rates and on environmental and political preferences. The survey was conducted shortly after a change in government and also gauged intent to participate in a new scheme with a split-sample manipulation in which the treatment group received a political prime. The results indicate that the initial uptake of the scheme launched by a Nationalist government was significantly lower among respondents close to the Labour Party. Five years later this effect had decayed. But intent to participate in the hypothetical scheme was lower among respondents close to the party in opposition (this time, the Nationalist Party), if primed with a cue that associates the new scheme with the Labour party. Formal modeling of scheme participation and intent (controlling for political and environmental ideology inter alia), yielded consistent results. These findings shed light on a new dimension which may be responsible for diverse rates of uptake of a public good schemes with practical implications for scheme promotion.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 69%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 77%

Section: Household Cooperation In Public-good Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Household Cooperation In Public-good Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partisanship, priming and participation in public-good schemes

Briguglio

Delaney

Wood

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…In Finland, the CAD-DIES project implemented in three neighbourhoods of Helsinki rests on the involvement of civil society organisations in education and urban planning (http://www.hyresbostader.se). Further examples are the Local Area Coordination Scheme (NDIS) in Australia (https://www.ndis.gov.au/community), and the Nurse-Family Partnership scheme in the US (https://www.nursefamilypartnership.org).13 https://dpg-pfandsystem.de 14 SeeBriguglio (2016) for a review of the literature on WM household cooperation and fees.15 Besides the German Pfand, there are also other examples of compensation for private engagement in co-production.In the UK, under the Taff Housing co-production scheme, tenants' work is valued through the concession of credits for…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Centralized standards and local taxation in municipal waste management

Liddo

Vinella

2020

Ann Public Coop Econ

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In the EU, standards for municipal waste sorting and recycling are established by the European central institutions, being mostly based on the available estimates of recyclable materials. In a simple model of co-production in municipal waste management with local taxation, we assess that central bodies enjoy more discretion and can set more ambitious targets in jurisdictions with stronger environmental preferences and/or lower expenditure needs. Incentives to engage in waste sorting and recycling are found to be less powerful with citizens who are less sensitive to the environmental preservation, and all the more when the public input has a high cost. This points to the conclusion that standards should be differentiated across jurisdictions, with due consideration of the local preferences and costs of waste management.

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