Household tax evasion

Abstract

Household members share public goods and make intra‐household transfers. We show how these features of the household interact with the tax evasion decision, and identify the dimensions in which household evasion differs from individual evasion. In the model we present two members of a household choose how much to contribute to a household public good and how much self‐employment income to evade. We are interested in how different evasion possibilities interact with the contribution decisions to the household public good and the role of income transfers within the household. We show the household evasion decision differs from the individual decision because it affects the outcome of the household contribution game. When household members are taxed as individuals neutrality applies when choices are not constrained. If the evasion level of one household member is constrained then an income transfer can generate a Pareto improvement. When the household members are jointly taxed there is a couple constraint on strategies and corner solutions can emerge.

Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments

“…Hashimzade et al (2021) propose a non‐cooperative model of household tax evasion. As household members share public goods and make intra‐household transfers, these features of the household are expected to interact with the tax evasion decision.…”

“…Carbonell-Nicolau (2019) identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an ad valorem tax to be inequality-reducing. Hashimzade et al (2021) propose a non-cooperative model of household tax evasion. As household members share public goods and make intra-household transfers, these features of the household are expected to interact with the tax evasion decision.…”