2010
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11
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How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens

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Cited by 41 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…Remember Hempel's diagnosis that tacitly introduced or deliberately suppressed background information is the source of the paradox. While perfectly agreeing with Hempel on this point, Fitelson and Hawthorne (2009) point out that Hempel is unable to make that difference in his own theory of confirmation. The reason is that his account is in general monotone with regard to the background knowledge: As long as the domain of the evidence is not extended (i.e.…”
mentioning
confidence: 62%
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“…Remember Hempel's diagnosis that tacitly introduced or deliberately suppressed background information is the source of the paradox. While perfectly agreeing with Hempel on this point, Fitelson and Hawthorne (2009) point out that Hempel is unable to make that difference in his own theory of confirmation. The reason is that his account is in general monotone with regard to the background knowledge: As long as the domain of the evidence is not extended (i.e.…”
mentioning
confidence: 62%
“…But comparative results can at least substantiate some of our intuitions about the paradox. The most recent and ambitious result in the area is due to Fitelson and Hawthorne (2009). They have argued that with the help of two apparently innocent assumptions, the raven paradox can be solved:…”
Section: The Comparative Paradoxmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…However, Hempel's own account of confirmation is inconsistent with this analysis (Fitelson and Hawthorne 2010): relative to the background knowledge…”
Section: Classical Problems For Qualitative Accountsmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…They quantify the degree to which the evidence in the rule's premise E provides support for or against the hypothesised piece of evidence in the rule's conclusion H (Fitelson, 2001). More formally, for a rule E → H, an interestingness measure c(H, E) has the property of Bayesian confirmation (i.e., it is a confirmation measure) when it satisfies the following conditions (1):…”
Section: Application Of the Visualization Techniquesmentioning
confidence: 99%