How Can China’s New Health Care Reform Promote the Balance of Interest Game?–Based on Game Evolution and Simulation Analysis

Abstract

Purpose The new round of medical reform is a significant exploration of reform in the public service sector in China. Health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients, as critical stakeholders in China’s medical reform, play a crucial role in the success of the reform through their strategic interactions. Patients and Methods Starting from the perspective of bounded rationality, applies evolutionary game theory to establish an evolutionary game model for the collaborative governance of health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients and analyzes the stability of each party’s strategy and the sensitivity of parameters in the tripartite game system. Results The study shows that an equilibrium point will be formed when medical institutions provide reasonable treatment, patients choose to accept treatment, and health insurance regulatory departments adopt a lenient regulatory strategy, maximizing the interests of all parties involved in the game. Factors such as the benefits of unreasonable treatment by medical institutions, fines, and regulatory costs impact the decision-making of health insurance regulatory departments. To maximize social welfare, health insurance regulatory departments should reform payment methods, adjust medical service behaviors of medical institutions, and guide the rational allocation of medical resources; the government should increase subsidies for the operation of medical institutions and the intensity of penalties; regulatory departments should reduce regulatory costs and introduce third-party forces to strengthen health insurance supervision further. Conclusion The research findings of this paper will provide valuable insights into some countries’ medical and health reform.

Human Resources Allocation of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in China

“…Health human resources in the western region are more likely to flow to the eastern and central regions, leading to greater regional disparities in the allocation of human resources. The public health services of the CDCs in China depend on the overall planning and construction of the administration, 21 which should implement the main responsibility for the construction, it should actively develop the level of the regional economy, and increase the investment to the CDCs, so as to compensate for the inadequacy of regional human resource allocation.…”

Equity and Prediction of Bed Allocation of the Department of Stomatology in Chinese Hospitals

“…28 Therefore, administrative departments should consider population, geographical and economic factors when planning the construction of beds of the department of stomatology in Chinese hospitals, so as to improve the coverage of oral health services. 29 At the same time, it is also necessary to pay attention to the situation of oral health services in remote and backward areas, and to raise the level of oral health services for all through measures such as promoting appropriate dental technology and supporting dental health personnel. 30 In terms of the Theil index contribution rate, inequality by population allocation comes mainly from between regions, while inequality by geographic and economic allocation comes mainly from within regions.…”

The cross-regional settlement methods in hospitals and the treatment-seeking behavior of patients with malignant tumors in China: an evolutionary game model

“…It is increasingly applied across various fields, such as mathematics, economics, and business management ( 32 ). Its extension to the field of healthcare management is also noteworthy, encompassing areas such as healthcare reforms ( 33 ), healthcare and social care coordination ( 34 ), and early warning of public health emergencies ( 35 ).…”