How Civil Resistance Succeeds (or Not): Micro‐Dynamics of Unity, Timing, and Escalatory Actions

Abstract

The article analyzes the micro‐sociological dynamics of civil resistance in the uprisings in Bahrain and Tunisia (2010‐11). It argues that the Tunisian uprising succeeded because regime repression generated solidarity and unity among diverse groups in society, while the regime increasingly suffered from miscommunication, mistrust, and increasing disobedience. In Bahrain, the movement initially enjoyed a high degree of unity and solidarity mobilizing against regime atrocities, but as the regime allowed protesters to demonstrate with little interference for a month, internal divisions emerged. Whereas Tunisian protesters launched a united escalation at a time of opponent weakness, factions of Bahraini activists escalated at a time of increasing division in the movement and society as a whole which both provoked and enabled a crackdown by the regime. Conclusively, success or failure of an uprising depends on a movement and a regime's ability to maintain unity respectively, as well as the timing of escalatory actions.

Avoiding violence: Eleven ways activists can confine violence in civil resistance campaigns

“…This powerful story demonstrates the potential of adopting and respecting the traditions of diverse groups affiliated with the regime in order to circumvent repression. While it is well known that funerals can serve as arenas for mobilization and relatively safe assembly (Bramsen, ; Tarrow, , p. 45), what I emphasize here is not the funeral as such but rather the approach of buying into the tradition of the opponents by wearing white and protesting in silence, hence showing respect and creating connections.…”

“…It is therefore crucial to discuss potential strategic advantages in violent regime repression. In the Arab Spring in Bahrain, Tunisia, and Syria, killings led to righteous anger and funerals that mobilized actors, whereas less visible and lethal repression-while arguably equally brutal-deenergizes actors (Bramsen, 2018). Thus, from a perspective of activist success, the prevention of direct violence might not be preferable, at least not if replaced by imprisonment, as in the case of Bahrain.…”

Micro-Sociological Dynamics of Repression: How Interactions between Protesters and Security Forces Shaped the Bahraini Uprising

“…The following day protesters approached the Pearl Roundabout with peaceful chants and roses. The intense pressure from demonstrators dominating the situation in loudness and numbers caused the police to retreat (Bramsen 2018). In the words of another participant, "unarmed peaceful protesters had opened the Pearl Roundabout without anything but determination" (personal communication, February 2015).…”

“…As time passed and the protesters were allowed to remain at the Pearl Roundabout, however, the unity of the protesters began to crumble (Bramsen 2018). Without more killings of protesters, the regime's lethal repression no longer kept the movement together in solidarity, and a split developed between the reformists and the revolutionaries: those demanding the overthrow of the regime and those who aspired for reform.…”

Comparing Protest Massacres

“…Then, polarization reaches a high point, and it is here where mass atrocities such as genocide in Rwanda (1994) can occur, argues Collins (). In a study of two nonviolent revolutionary movements, Bramsen () found that the killing of protesters in Tunisia during the 2011 Arab Spring helped to unite a majority of the Tunisian population and trigger a new integrated call for the overthrowing of the regime. Anger, group solidarity, and a common consciousness emerged after these killings (Bramsen, : 69).…”