How Civil Wars End

Abstract

What conditions determine whether a civil war ends in a negotiated settlement or a military victory? The authors address this question by developing an expected utility model of the choice between seeking an immediate settlement or continuing to fight in anticipation of eventual victory. The model implies that the likelihood of a settlement varies with estimates of the probability of winning, the time required to win, the rate at which the costs of conflict accrue, and the payoffs for victory versus settlement. Logistic regression results suggest that a settlement becomes less likely the larger the government's army and more likely the longer the civil war lasts. Payoff and cost variables had no effect on the likelihood of a settlement.

Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post‐Civil‐War Democracy*

“…Several recent studies have explored the relationship between civil war and democratization, and they suggest that inconclusive wars (i.e., wars that do not result in a decisive victory) that are also very costly can lead warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement from which a more inclusive and democratic system can emerge (Wood, 2001; Wantchekon and Neeman, 2002). Earlier works have shown that the longer a civil war lasts, the less likely it is to end in a decisive victory by either side and the more likely it is to end in a negotiated settlement (Mason and Fett, 1996). These findings suggest that negotiated settlements are a way out of war for protagonists locked in a costly and stalemated civil war.…”

“…High war costs and long duration reduce both sides' estimate of their probability of victory and increase their estimate of the total costs they will have to absorb in order to achieve victory. As such, the higher the costs of conflict, the lower will be their expected payoff from continuing to fight (in anticipation of eventual victory) versus seeking a settlement (Mason and Fett, 1996). War outcomes, on the other hand, largely determine how post‐civil‐war power will be distributed.…”

“…To model the impact of civil war outcome on the postconflict power balance between contending elites, we employ an expected utility model of protagonists' choice between continuing to fight or stopping. This model has been used to explain civil war outcomes (Mason and Fett, 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, 1999), civil war duration (Regan, 2002; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004), and civil war recurrence (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 2007). The same choice parameters can be used to explain how the prospects for democratization might be enhanced or depressed by civil war.…”

“…Research on civil wars has gone beyond an initial concern with attributes of a nation that put it at risk of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004) to the analysis of factors that explain the duration and outcome of civil wars (Balch‐Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Fearon, 2004; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Mason and Fett, 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett, 1999) and, recently, the question of what factors explain the duration of the peace after a civil war has ended (e.g., Walter, 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, 2007; Fortna, 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). On the latter question, Fortna (2004) finds that peace‐keeping operations contribute to a more durable peace, while Doyle and Sambanis (2000) present evidence that peace‐keeping operations help sustain peace and support democracy.…”

Peasants, Choice, and Civil Wars

“…David Mason has been a pioneer in the systematic study of civil wars (Mason 1984; Mason and Krane 1989; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). Caught in the Crossfire: Revolutions, Repression, and the Rational Peasant reflects that experience.…”