2019
DOI: 10.3386/w25716
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How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?

Abstract: Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumb… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…This dataset is restricted; however, one can apply for it with IRB and get access within a month. Other data comes from Dippel and Poyker (2019) and Poyker and Dippel (2019). Below we provide the description of the data and how it was obtained.…”
Section: Sentencing Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…This dataset is restricted; however, one can apply for it with IRB and get access within a month. Other data comes from Dippel and Poyker (2019) and Poyker and Dippel (2019). Below we provide the description of the data and how it was obtained.…”
Section: Sentencing Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The example is from Washington, where judges are elected for fouryear cycles. This data is from (Dippel and Poyker, 2019) and was originally collected from ballotpedia.org. In Minnesota, judges are elected for six-year cycles.…”
Section: Alabamamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…It shows that electoral competition leads judges to levy harsher sentences in the lead-up to elections (Huber and Gordon, 2004;Berdejó and Yuchtman, 2013;Dippel and Poyker, 2019;Abrams, Galbiati, Henry, and Philippe, 2019). The presence of such cycles implies that 'direct influence' by private prisons should be most important when judges are seeking re-election (by way of campaign contributions).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%