How do Competing Interest Groups Influence Environmental Policy? The Case of Renewable Electricity in Industrialized Democracies, 1989–2007

Abstract

In this article, we examine the effect of competing interest groups on environmental policy. We argue that the supporters of environmental policy should be the most influential in the absence of opposition, while the opposition's importance is maximized when the supporter coalition is strong. This highlights an important asymmetry between competing interest groups: supporters are decisive in the absence of opposition, while the opposition is only relevant if the supporters are already strong.We test the argument against data on renewable electricity generation in nineteen OECD countries, 1989-2007. Heavy industries have particularly strong incentives to oppose policies that support renewables, because heavy industries' profitability depends on inexpensive electricity. We find that the supporter coalition has a positive effect on the growth of renewable electricity generation, but the positive effect diminishes with the strength of manufacturing. Moreover, heavy industry has a negative effect on the growth of renewable electricity generation and this effect increases with the strength of the supporter coalition.

Niche construction and empowerment through socio-political work. A meta-analysis of six low-carbon technology cases

“…Technology advocates also need to be politically powerful to stretch-and-transform regime-structures, and this power rests on resource attributes, experience, institutional positions, and connections with other influential actors (Cheon and Urpelainen, 2013). Stretch-and-transform empowerment is more difficult than fit-and-conform, e ause … a epta e … is o e likel he the innovation is perceived to meet the goals that are consonant with already widely accepted goals (Johnson et al, 2006: 72).…”

“…Our analysis also responds to calls for more politically informed analyses of transition dynamics and system transformation more generally (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013;Hendriks and Grin 2007, Shove and Walker 2007, Scrase and Smith 2009, Meadowcroft 2011, Kern 2012Cheon and Urpelainen, 2013;Hess, 2013). In order to shed light on the politics of protective space, the propositions adopt an actor-oriented perspective (Ferguson et al in press;Farla et al, 2012) focussing on the strategic work that technology advocates undertake when attempting to construct, maintain and expand protective spaces.…”

Trade union density and social expenditure: a longitudinal analysis of policy feedback effects in OECD countries, 1980–2010

“…Prior research has confirmed that collective actors can have an effect on government policy (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013;Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995). For example, Htun and Weldon's (2012) comparative investigation of the effect of feminist mobilization on policies regarding violence against women provides compelling evidence of the impact of mobilization campaigns on government policy.…”

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“…Relative absence of effective opposition, compared to other parts of the UK, has relevance here. Forging coherent networks around energy development may matter more where there are potentially effective opposing actors (see also Cheon and Urpelainen 2013), and this in turn, may be particularly relevant to certain combinations of technological pathways and contexts. Seen in this light, Scotland has best displayed the kind of actor networks conducive to facilitating renewable energy expansion based on the bulk provision of controversial technologies like on-shore wind, where sustained elite cohesion around the conjunction of financial support and stable planning conditions are particularly important for investment.…”