2015
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2014.1000652
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How do EU Foreign Policy-Makers Decide? Institutional Orientations within the European External Action Service

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Cited by 21 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…However, the differing institutional backgrounds of EEAS staff are also likely to include ‘organizational and cultural clashes’ (Davis Cross, 2011: 454). It is these structural obstacles, along with lack of training strategy (Juncos and Pomorska, 2014: 316) and the clashes between competing institutional (intergovernmental versus supranational) logics (Henökl, 2015: 679), that hamper the creation of a common culture (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013: 1316).…”
Section: Introducing the Eeasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the differing institutional backgrounds of EEAS staff are also likely to include ‘organizational and cultural clashes’ (Davis Cross, 2011: 454). It is these structural obstacles, along with lack of training strategy (Juncos and Pomorska, 2014: 316) and the clashes between competing institutional (intergovernmental versus supranational) logics (Henökl, 2015: 679), that hamper the creation of a common culture (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska, 2013: 1316).…”
Section: Introducing the Eeasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different staff groups, depending on their source of recruitment and present organizational affiliation tend to emphasize rules and signals by forums. Unveiled by earlier research (Henökl, 2014b(Henökl, , 2015, this situation is aggravated by the presence of organizational ambiguities with regard to roles and rules, mission and vision as well as by political rivalries between community institutions, Council as well as the member states. This may result in a -problem of many eyes‖ (Bovens et al, 2010, p. 41).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Merton already mentions this (Merton 1936, 903; see also Burlyuk 2017, 1016), but we now have a broader literature on the socialisation of EU officials and decision-makers into institutional substantive or behavioural norms, which helps explain why foreseen and unwelcome consequences are nevertheless permitted (cf. Bellier 2000;Chelotti 2015;Henökl 2015;Hooghe 2002;2012;Kassim et.al. ;Juncos and Pomorska 2006;2010;2011;Lewis 2010).…”
Section: Explaining Unintended Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%