2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1685719
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How Do Firms Adjust Their Wage Bill in Belgium ? A Decomposition Along the Intensive and Extensive Margins

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 80 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Our results contrast with the findings of Campbell (1991), who reports a negative correlation between sector-level wage flexibility and the capital-labour ratio in the US. But they are consistent with the finding in Fuss (2009) that, in Belgium, wage cuts in adverse times are largely non-existent in the construction sector (the most labour-intensive) contrary to the manufacturing and services sectors. Also, our finding that wage rigidity is stronger in labour-intensive sectors complements the view that the higher degree of price stickiness observed in more labourintensive sectors might result from wage rigidity, see Altissimo et al (2006), Álvarez et al (2006), Dhyne et al (2006) and Vermeulen et al (2007).…”
Section: Technology Competition and Institutions One By Onesupporting
confidence: 90%
“…Our results contrast with the findings of Campbell (1991), who reports a negative correlation between sector-level wage flexibility and the capital-labour ratio in the US. But they are consistent with the finding in Fuss (2009) that, in Belgium, wage cuts in adverse times are largely non-existent in the construction sector (the most labour-intensive) contrary to the manufacturing and services sectors. Also, our finding that wage rigidity is stronger in labour-intensive sectors complements the view that the higher degree of price stickiness observed in more labourintensive sectors might result from wage rigidity, see Altissimo et al (2006), Álvarez et al (2006), Dhyne et al (2006) and Vermeulen et al (2007).…”
Section: Technology Competition and Institutions One By Onesupporting
confidence: 90%
“…Few recent papers look at these questions at the microeconomic level. Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) and Fuss (2008) examine the relative importance of average wage and employment flows in wage bill adjustment but do not estimate the elasticity of labour compensation and employment.…”
Section: Ecb Working Paper Series No 1021mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, our estimates do not provide a test or a measure of real wage rigidity. There is no theoretical reference value for the average labour compensation elasticity and labour elasticity under the 14 See Fuss (2008) for evidence that variations in hours per worker and the number of days worked are significantly lower in cases of falling sales and wage bill contractions. 15 For comparison, Bertola et al (2008) report that on average over 15 European countries, around 30% of firms declare that they reduce employment, 11% of the firms reduce pay, and up to 7% cut working time.…”
Section: Estimating the Elasticity Of Average Labour Compensation Andmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When sales declines persist, firms may find it necessary or more relevant to reduce their own labour force. However, as shown, in a previous version of the paper (Fuss, 2008), most of employment adjustment is contemporaneous to the sales declines. So sales declines may induce a mix of a smaller reduction in the number of …”
Section: Results Of the Wage Bill Decompositionmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…14 Robustness with respect to alternative trimming of the sample and definition of the favourable vs. adverse times are shown in a previous version of the paper (Fuss, 2008). Each component of the wage bill decomposition is the same size in all samples.…”
Section: Results Of the Wage Bill Decompositionmentioning
confidence: 94%