How Do Logics Explain?

Payette, Gillman; Wyatt, Nicole

doi:10.1080/00048402.2017.1342674

Cited by 14 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…If logical predictivism is indeed the best candidate for an anti-exceptionalist model of logical methodology, then the anti-exceptionalist will need a solution to the background logic problem, contrary to what has been suggested recently in the literature [41]. A failure to solve the problem will be tantamount to admitting that logical theories cannot be reliably tested.…”

Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 88%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.

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Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 88%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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“…(Priest 2016, 353)[W]hat we are looking to explain is the validity/invalidity of some argument consisting of (fully interpreted) natural language sentences. (Payette and Wyatt 2018, 159)While foundationalist accounts of logic’s epistemology propose that we have direct access to knowledge of validity whether in terms of rational insight or epistemic analyticity (Martin 2021), methodological anti-exceptionalists propose we gain knowledge of validity by constructing theories, which are at least partially evidenced by their ability to explain the target phenomenon. Consequently, it is logics’ ability to provide extrasystemic explanations of validity which is the substance of the anti-exceptionalist’s claim that logics explain: Validity Explanation ( VE ): Logics provide extrasystemic explanations of validity.Clearly, VE is far from trivial.…”

Section: Methodological Anti-exceptionalism and Logical Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation

Martin

2021

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations in logic. This paper clarifies these challenges, and shows how the practice-based approach is best placed to meet them.

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“…We may speak loosely of inference to the best explanation, although in the case of logical theorems we do not mean specifically causal explanation, but rather a wider process of bringing our miscellaneous information under generalizations that unify it in illuminating ways. (p. 334) It is a difficult question what kind of explanation logical theories may provide (Wyatt & Payette, 2018). For the purposes of this paper, I assume the abductivist has a satisfying answer.…”

Section: Abductivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This claim must be distinguished from the descriptive claim that theory choice in the history of logic has happened (more or less) in accordance with an abductive methodology. I will leave this claim for historians Wyatt and Payette (2018). seem to have this historical claim in mind.…”

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confidence: 99%

Limits of Abductivism About Logic

Hlobil

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic. For we must identify the relevant data in order to use abduction. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abductivism.

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How Do Logics Explain?

Cited by 14 publications

References 19 publications

Logical Predictivism

Logical Predictivism

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation

Limits of Abductivism About Logic

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