2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.10.004
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How do “Mineral-States” Learn? Path-Dependence, Networks, and Policy Change in the Development of Economic Institutions

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Cited by 40 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…However, most analyses underline the historical and path‐dependent processes of state formation that culminated in a state apparatus capable of regulating natural resources in the public interest in some countries, but not in others (Crabtree and Crabtree‐Condor, ; Kurtz, : 480–1). In this regard, states have been categorized as either capable or incapable of managing their resource wealth, but there has been little consideration of the possibility of movement from one category to another (Haber and Menaldo, : 2; Kurtz and Brooks, : 749; a notable exception is Orihuela, ). It is exactly this question that motivates this article: how and why an opportunity to appropriate and waste resource rents, once created, may deteriorate into permanent rent seeking and patronage in one case, and yet be turned around into productive developmentalism in another.…”
Section: Rents and The Resource Cursementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…However, most analyses underline the historical and path‐dependent processes of state formation that culminated in a state apparatus capable of regulating natural resources in the public interest in some countries, but not in others (Crabtree and Crabtree‐Condor, ; Kurtz, : 480–1). In this regard, states have been categorized as either capable or incapable of managing their resource wealth, but there has been little consideration of the possibility of movement from one category to another (Haber and Menaldo, : 2; Kurtz and Brooks, : 749; a notable exception is Orihuela, ). It is exactly this question that motivates this article: how and why an opportunity to appropriate and waste resource rents, once created, may deteriorate into permanent rent seeking and patronage in one case, and yet be turned around into productive developmentalism in another.…”
Section: Rents and The Resource Cursementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this regard, some researchers have begun to recognize that institutional reform to overcome the resource curse needs to take into account the social foundations of institutions, including the political bargaining, pact making, and policy networks that underlie effective institutional innovation (Dietsche, : 130; Kurtz, : 483; Nem Singh and Bourgouin, : 20; Orihuela, : 141). Most of the literature on change agents in resource politics has hitherto focused on civil society actors that protest outside of normal institutional channels, with the objective of stopping individual mining projects.…”
Section: Rents and The Resource Cursementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Dietsche, 2008;Rosser, 2006) that formally "devolve" authority at the same time as promoting investment in the territory, allowing mediation among conflicting territorial projects in ways that arrive at some degree of consensus. This institutional change can also lead to new forms of democracy that lead to the emergence of policy networks that are more effective in managing a resource-dependent economy (Orihuela, 2013) and to the formulation and implementation of economic policies for local territorial development (for example, through the mechanisms of neocorporatist democracy fostered by the Ecuadorian indigenous movements analyzed by Ospina Peralta, Santillana Ortiz, and Arboleda (2008). The emergence of such territorialized institutions is not straightforward, especially in contexts where national governments might also seek to strengthen their control over the resources generated by resource extraction with a view to using them for national social and political projects.…”
Section: (C) Social Coalitions and Institutional Changementioning
confidence: 99%