How do Non-Monetary Performance Incentives for Physicians Affect the Quality of Medical Care? - A Laboratory Experiment

Abstract

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Second opinions in markets for expert services: Experimental evidence

“…39 The physicians in our experiment privately observe after each period the number and type of patients that have accepted or rejected their treatment recommendation. Hence, our set-up is closer to the private feedback condition of Kairies and Krieger (2013). Taken together, although several studies show differences between medical and non-medical students, the evidence is still inconclusive and might be sensitive to the specific setting.…”

Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

“…The choices of subject pool and framing are crucial for the design of economic experiments. In studies that analyze physician behavior, the most common choice is a student subject pool with medical framing (See, for example, Lagarde and Blaauw [ 34 ], Brosig-Koch et al [ 9 ], Brosig-Koch et al [ 35 ], Brosig-Koch et al [ 13 ], Keser et al [ 10 ], Hennig-Schmidt et al [ 7 ], and Kairies and Krieger [ 36 ]). Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt [ 37 ] and Gneezy et al [ 38 ] emphasize that contextual framing has advantages as well as disadvantages, and therefore the framing choice depends on the underlying question.…”

Medical insurance and free choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experiment

“…First, it contributes to the recently emerging literature in experimental health economics. A series of laboratory experiments (Brosig-Koch et al 2013a, 2013b, Kairies and Krieger 2013, Keser et al 2014, Keser et al 2013, Green 2014 investigate incentive effects of remuneration systems for physician behavior. For example, Hennig-Schmidt et al (2011) compare a capitation system (in which the physician gets paid per patient independent of the treatment provided) and a fee-for-service system (in which payment does depend on the treatment provided).…”