How Do People Evaluate Foreign Aid To ‘Nasty’ Regimes?

Abstract

Recent theories of foreign aid assume that moral motives drive voters’ preferences about foreign aid. However, little is known about how moral concerns interact with the widely accepted instrumental goals that aid serves. Moreover, what effects does this interplay have on preferences over policy actions? This article assesses these questions using a survey experiment in which respondents evaluate foreign aid policies toward nasty recipient regimes (those that violate human rights, rig elections, crack down on media, etc.). The results indicate that the public does have a strong aversion to providing aid to nasty recipient regimes, but that it also appreciates the instrumental benefits that aid helps acquire. Contrary to a mainstay assertion in the literature, the study finds that moral aversion can largely be reversed if the donor government engages more with the nasty country. These findings call into question the micro-foundations of recent theories of foreign aid, and produce several implications for the aid literature.

The Public’s Foreign Aid Priorities: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment

“…We benchmark the effects of an array of factors to those associated with the cost of a proposal. Our approach builds on findings reported by Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) and Blackman (2018). Like us, these studies use experimental designs to assess how various facets of foreign aid proposals affect people’s willingness to support specific aid packages.…”

“…Like us, these studies use experimental designs to assess how various facets of foreign aid proposals affect people’s willingness to support specific aid packages. The Heinrich and Kobayashi (2020) study focused on willingness to provide aid to countries that engage in “nasty,” illiberal practices; the Blackman (2018) study explored how religious considerations affect support for aid. We corroborate and build on these findings in a number of ways.…”

The cyclicality of government foreign-aid expenditure: voter awareness in “good” times and in “bad”

“…The costs of failing to reduce politicians' discretion to rely on "fiscal illusion" in economic upturns depends on the nature of the distortion. If voters underestimate the benefits (Heinrich et al 2016) and overestimate the costs of overseas aid (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2018), the question is whether reliance on "fiscal illusion" (to increase overseas aid) is the most efficient way of providing a merit want. Many might argue that governments should rely on the alternative policy option of providing accurate information (to correct misperceptions).…”

“…When focusing on foreign aid, governments have an incentive to time increases in that spending when voters are least aware of their effects because: (1) voters underestimate the benefits of foreign aid (Heinrich et al 2016) and (2) overestimate its costs (Heinrich and Kobayashi 2018). In some cases, governments also have an additional incentive to time increases in spending during economic upturns because they have their own ideological reasons to expand foreign aid.…”

Feeling their pain: affective empathy and public preferences for foreign development aid

“…Finally, though a considerable body of research has analyzed whether foreign aid is effective in promoting growth and reducing poverty (Bauer, 1993; Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Chenery and Strout, 1996; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Dalgaard et al, 2004; Easterly, 2001; Goldin et al, 2002; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Levy, 1988; Mosley, 1980; Stiglitz, 2002; Roodman, 2007), there has been little direct examination of how information on aid effectiveness shapes public preferences for foreign aid. However, there is growing recognition that effectiveness of foreign aid shapes donor publics’ views (Bodenstein and Faust, 2017; Heinrich and Kobayashi, 2018; Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012; Knack and Eubank, 2009; Komiya et al, 2018). When publics believe that aid has actually fulfilled its objectives, they are more likely to support it.…”