How does culture influence corporate risk-taking?

Li, Kai; Griffin, Dale W.; Yue, Heng; Zhao, Liang

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.07.008

Cited by 659 publications

(522 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…1 Our paper is consistent with the views of Stulz and Williamson (2003), Li et al (2013) and Lievenbrück and Schmid (2014), who emphasize the impact of culture (including values extracted from religious scriptures) on economic policies and institutions. This paper studies the contractual relationship between risk-averse lenders and borrowers in a stylized setting.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 85%

“…inflexibilities; (iii) inadequate market practice, standards of origination, trading and investor protection; in addition to (v) a feeble local institutional investor base (see Stulz and Williamson, 2003;Jobst, 2007;Li et al, 2013;and Lievenbrück and Schmid, 2014). It is thus not surprising that most of these economies have deeper bank-based, as opposed to a market-based, financial system (see Wilson, 2012).…”

Section: Securitization In Muslim Economiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can Islamic injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt?

Ebrahim

Jaafar

Omar

et al. 2016

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Section: Securitization In Muslim Economiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Islamic injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt?

Ebrahim

Jaafar

Omar

et al. 2016

Journal of Corporate Finance

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“…An increasing number of studies document an association between national culture and firm outcomes such as capital structure and risk-taking (Li et al, 2011(Li et al, , 2013, debt maturity choices (Zheng et al, 2012), and cash holdings (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009 country of origin, we use data from the Polity IV database to control for political regime characteristics. We experiment with many other such variables from a number of data sources (e.g., freedom, institutional, and economic variables from the Fraser Institute), and our main results remain essentially unaffected.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Board Directors from Countries with Different Genetic Diversity Levels on Corporate Performance

et al. 2017

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We link genetic diversity in the country of origin of the firms' board members with corporate performance via board members' nationality. We hypothesize that our approach captures deep-rooted differences in cultural, institutional, social, psychological, physiological, and other traits that cannot be captured by other recently measured indices of diversity. Using a panel of firms listed in the North American and U.K. stock markets, we find that adding board directors from countries with different levels of genetic diversity (either higher or lower) increases firm performance. This effect prevails when we control for a number of cultural, institutional, firm-level, and board member characteristics, as well as for the nationality of the board of directors. To identify the relationship, we use as instrumental variables for our diversity indices the migratory distance from East Africa and the level of ultraviolet exposure in the directors' country of nationality.

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“…12 See, also, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006), Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao (2013), Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010), Titman, Wei, and Xie (2013), Siegel, Licht, andSchwartz (2013), Ferris, Jayaraman, andSabherwal (2013), Pan and Pirinsky (2015), Chen, Podolski, Rhee, and Veeraraghavan (2014), and Chen, Dou, Rhee, Truong, and Veeraraghavan (2015). 13 CIQ attempts to make the data consistent across countries; however, such an effort has obvious limitations due to differences in accounting practices across countries.…”

Section: Cross-country Comparisons Of Executive Compensation and mentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences, and Consequences

Burns¹,

Minnick

Starks

2017

J. Financ. Quant. Anal.

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Using a cross-country sample, we examine the chief executive officer (CEO) tournament structure (measured alternatively as the ratio and the difference of pay between the CEO and other top executives within a firm). We find the tournament structure to vary systematically with firm and country cultural characteristics. In particular, firm size and the cultural values of power distance, fair income differences, and competition are significantly associated with variations in tournament structures. We also establish support for the primary implication of tournament theory in that tournament structure tends to be positively related to firm value, even after controlling for endogeneity.

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How does culture influence corporate risk-taking?

Cited by 659 publications

References 42 publications

Can Islamic injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt?

Can Islamic injunctions indemnify the structural flaws of securitized debt?

The Effect of Board Directors from Countries with Different Genetic Diversity Levels on Corporate Performance

CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences, and Consequences

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