How does it feel to act together?

Abstract

This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency.

On the Awareness of Joint Agency: A Pessimistic Account of the Feelings of Acting Together

“…The optimistic view (Pacherie ; Tollefsen ; Tollefsen Kreuz, and Dale ) suggests that in order to articulate the awareness of joint agency, we engage in a compare‐and‐contrast between the sense of individual agency and the sense of joint agency. If I am breakdancing, I experience a perception of a match between what I intend to do and my bodily movements during a headspin.…”

“…The second worry is that if the experience of the shared emotion is focused on the outcome‐related aspect of the phenomenology of joint agency—we are succeeding in our game—then the experience cannot be based in the present, but only inferred after the activity has been completed. Pacherie () makes a helpful distinction between two aspects of the phenomenology of joint agency: an outcome‐related aspect and an agent‐related aspect. Suppose Donald and Hillary are engaged in the joint action of carrying a piano up a flight of stairs.…”

“…However, little work has been done on the phenomenology of the awareness of joint agency. Recent views concerning the awareness of doing things together jointly suggest that the experience of subjects engaging in cooperation involves a positive here and now experience of the activity being under joint control (Pacherie , ; Tollefsen ; Tollefsen, Kreuz, and Dale ). In some ways this optimistic take on the experiences of cooperation is the standard view.…”

The narrative sense of others

“…One strategy is to base the "we" or collective sense of intention on a shared sense of joint agency as Pacherie (2014) suggests. But Pacherie also argues that the sense (experience) of joint agency is to be found in the individual, not at a superindividual level of group mind.…”

“…If, however, we look closer, I think we can see something that goes beyond conceptual individualism. Pacherie (2014) agrees that an individual's sense of agency is based on a complex of multiple factors that involve intention formation (see Gallagher 2012a). Let's consider her threefold distinction between different kinds of intentions.…”