How Does the Government Promote the Collaborative Innovation of Green Building Projects? An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Abstract

In order to study how to promote the collaborative innovation of green building projects of construction enterprises, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of suppliers’ participation in collaborative innovation of green building projects of construction enterprises under government governance. Through a numerical simulation, our research analyzes the influence of government tax preference, government infrastructure construction, and environmental pollution punishment on the behavior of the government, suppliers, and construction enterprises. The empirical research shows that the government’s tax incentives will continue to encourage suppliers to choose collaborative innovation. If the government’s short-term tax incentives are small, construction enterprises will evolve in the direction of midway betrayal. When the government’s long-term tax incentives are large, construction enterprises will evolve in the direction of the collaborative innovation of green building projects. Furthermore, the government’s infrastructure support for suppliers to participate in collaborative innovation of green building projects of construction enterprises will encourage suppliers and construction enterprises to choose green building projects for collaborative innovation. With the continuous maturity of green building projects in the construction market, the government has evolved from positive governance to negative governance. The government will take the opportunity to give up infrastructure construction and turn to other supporting policies. Lastly, a low intensity of environmental pollution punishment makes it difficult to promote the construction enterprises to evolve in the direction of collaborative innovation. A moderate intensity of environmental pollution punishment can encourage construction enterprises to evolve in the direction of collaborative innovation, while high-intensity environmental pollution punishment can encourage construction enterprises to choose the direction of midway betrayal. Environmental pollution punishment has no significant impact on suppliers’ selection of collaborative innovation of green building projects in the short term.

Can carbon reduction policies promote sustainable construction development? Evidence from China’s green building market

“…The development and maintenance of green buildings involves complex technological issues such as technology adoption and energy performance transformation [ 41 ]. Green building technology is a decisive factor in realizing clean and green development in the construction industry [ 17 , 18 ]. Therefore, technological innovation is the key to achieving sustainable development in the green building industry [ 42 ].…”

“…They use environmentally friendly materials, combined with resource-saving and energyreducing building concepts, to reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions associated with design, construction, operation, and maintenance, leading to healthier and more resource-efficient building models [14,15]. As such, they are an important way to realize a clean and green construction sector [16][17][18].The World Bank predicts that the contribution of building energy efficiency to the achievement of energy saving and emission reduction targets is about 70%, which means that green buildings will become an important trend in the future [19]. However, despite years of promotion and rapid technological advances, the development of green buildings is still limited and uncertain [20].…”

A three evolutionary game model for driving mechanism of industry-university-research collaborative innovation in agricultural innovation ecosystems

“…The prerequisite for collaborative innovation by agriculture-related enterprises, universities and research institutions is the signing of a contract and the payment of a deposit in advance.Under the guarantee of the contract, if any player betrays the contract involving agriculture-related enterprises, universities & scientific research institutions, it will pay the corresponding liquidated damages to the other player [ 54 , 55 ]. Assuming that when the agriculture-related enterprises, universities & research institutions betray the synergistic innovation, the liquidated damages to be paid to the other player are W a and W u respectively.…”

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Collaborative Green Innovation in Supply Chain under Digital Enablement

“…In addition, collaborative green innovation in the supply chain is affected by many factors [43]. Among them, government subsidies [44], collaborative innovation benefits and costs [45], benefit distribution mechanisms [46], reward and punishment mechanisms [47], and policy support are considered the main factors affecting the game strategy of collaborative innovation in the supply chain [48]. Under the background of digital enablement, the influence of these factors on collaborative green innovation in the supply chain is worth further discussion.…”