Industry has responded to the ever-growing presence of spam by attacking the spam distribution infrastructure, essentially trying to prevent spam email from ever landing in the inbox of end-users. Recently, industry and academia have begun investigating the web hosting infrastructure of spam campaigns, attacking spammers where it hurts most, in their pocketbooks. Spammers have responded by introducing cooperative intermediaries that redirect traffic, effectively decoupling the spamadvertised URL from the final destination website.In this study, we analyze not only the URLs in spam messages, but the less-studied redirection infrastructure that takes the user to a target website or other malicious host. Our initial results show that among all the hosts that can be reached directly from URLs embedded in email bodies, 64.87% are cooperative redirection hosts. However, these redirection hosts are only used to protect a small portion (11.33%) of final destination websites.Additionally, we find that around 70% of embedded URLs resolve to two ranges of IP space (61.0.0.0/8 and 124.0.0.0/8). By further analyzing the relationship between the final destinations and redirection hosts, we find that 74.19% of the final destination hosts are located in the same AS with their redirection hosts.