How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy

Abstract

We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fine reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fine are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.

When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil

“…While turnout is unaffected (which is expected, as turnout is mandatory in Brazil), the number of blank and invalid ballots is significantly lower in two-round municipalities (Table 3). Given evidence that these ballots are often cast by dissatisfied or disinterested voters (Gonzales et al, 2019), the reduction suggests that voters in two-round elections engage in the electoral process at higher rates. 17…”