How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency

Abstract

We argue that a number of difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the FregeGeach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We argue that a prominent realist solution to the problem of explaining logical inconsistency can be adopted by expressivists. By doing so, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence more in line with philosophical orthodoxy, while simultaneously purchasing herself the right to appeal to a wider class of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizing than is allowed, for instance, by Mark Schroeder in his recent work.Finally, it emerges that a standard objection to expressivist theories is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem. We explain this misinterpretation and show how expressivists can easily skirt the objection it motivates.

Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form

“…21 This can be spelled out in a roughly Tarskian fashion even in the context of assertion and denial. Note that capturing the particularly pragmatic aspect of my above examples is harder-see Baker and Woods (2015) for both points in more detail. 22 Nothing I have said here shows that there is not some restricted version of Cut which can be justified in the way Restall suggests.…”

“…If assertion and denial are connected with belief and disbeliefand surely they are-then the fact that it is rationally incoherent to assert and deny φ plausibly explains why it is incorrect to come to simultaneously believe and disbelieve φ, for any φ. And, finally, Restall's account can plausibly be extended to cover cases like imperatival inference in a fashion similar to how Baker and Woods (2015) handle inconsistency between mental states similar to assertion and denial, it is thus promising as a uniform treatment of logical consequence. 6 My purpose in the following is to show that Restall's justification of the structural rule of cut fails for the intuitive notion of incoherence governing our assertions unless we assume a notion of logical form, but that assuming a notion of logical form is worrisome for a foundational project of the sort Restall is engaged in.…”

Subjective Disagreement

“…But this isn't the only possibility. Baker and Woods () observe that the attitudes of liking the taste of escargot and disliking the taste of escargot seem to disagree with one another, even though the objects of these attitudes would appear to be an entity (the taste of escargot), not a proposition (centered or otherwise) . Perhaps, then, we should think of Ava and Bert's disagreement in attitude along these lines.…”

Advice for Noncognitivists

“…Gibbard () insists that expressivists have every right to base their semantics for the language of morals on a primitive notion of inconsistency between basic attitudes (see also Baker and Woods, ) but here I am interested in the prospects of an explanatory strategy pursued, but ultimately deemed to be unsuccessful in an expressivist setting, by Schroeder (). Start with the classical explanation of the inconsistency between the belief that grass is green and the belief that grass is not green.…”