How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study

Berger, Helge; Neugart, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00539.x

“…However, labour courts have substantial discretion in interpreting and developing the legal framework. There is evidence that decisions of labour courts are not only driven by legal principles but also by political attitudes and circumstances, labour market conditions and even the gender composition of the courts (Berger and Neugart , ). Workers’ chance to win a legal dispute appears to depend on where and when their cases are filed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

Jirjahn

¹

,

Mohrenweiser

²

2015

Brit J Industrial Rel

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Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that the managerial environment has a strong influence on the introduction and survival of works councils. Employees in owner‐managed establishments are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if the establishment is owner‐managed. The pattern of results even holds in situations that involve positive economic effects of works councils. This suggests that owner‐managers oppose works councils not primarily for economic reasons. Our findings are rather consistent with the hypothesis that owner‐managers oppose co‐determination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.

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“…In addition, union membership raises the likelihood that a dismissed worker will obtain severance pay (Goerke and Pannenberg 2010), and being represented by a union lawyer increases the probability of winning a labour court case (Berger and Neugart 2012). This may explain why the probability of being individually dismissed in Germany is significantly lower for union members than non-members (Goerke and Pannenberg 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 87%

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Goerke

¹

,

Pannenberg

²

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behaviour will respond to the sick pay reform. Terms of use: Documents inWe show that union members may have stronger incentives to be absent and to react to the cut in sick pay. In the empirical investigation, we find a positive relationship between trade union membership and absence due to sickness and observe more pronounced reactions to the cut in sick pay among union members than among non-members. These findings suggest that more flexibility in the use of paid absence due to sickness constitutes a private gain from trade union membership.JEL-Code: I180, J510, J220.Keywords: difference-in-differences, sickness-related absence, Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), statutory sick pay, trade union membership. We are grateful to Nicolas Ziebarth for helpful comments and for providing background information on industry-specific bargaining contracts. Also, special thanks to Laszlo Goerke

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“…As one consequence, it has been established that trade union membership raises the likelihood that a dismissed worker obtains a severance payment (Goerke and Pannenberg 2010). Furthermore, Berger and Neugart (2010) show for a small sample of workers dismissed by the same firm in Germany between 2003 and 2006 that being represented by a union lawyer raises the probability of winning a labour court case. If, therefore, being a member of a trade union raises the costs of a dismissal, firms will, ceteris paribus, be more likely to terminate the employment contract of a non-union worker.…”

Section: Summary and Interpretative Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade union membership and dismissals

Goerke

¹

,

Pannenberg

²

2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. Terms of use: Documents inThe decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. AbstractIn Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to freeride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.JEL Classification: C 23, H 41, J 51, J 63

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How German Labor Courts Decide: An Econometric Case Study

Cited by 23 publications

References 32 publications

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Trade union membership and dismissals

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