How Has Regulation FD Affected the Operations of Financial Analysts?*

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how financial analysts generate information, make decisions about firm coverage, and try to maintain their forecasting accuracy after the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Reg FD"). Using the model developed by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 1998, we find that analysts are investing more effort in idiosyncratic information discovery. In order to do this, individual analysts appear to be reducing coverage for well-followed firms while increasing coverage of firms that were less followed prior to Reg FD. Analysts who had preferential links with firms that they covered, such as analysts from large brokerage houses, tend to have greater forecast accuracy in the pre-FD period. However, these analysts are unable to sustain their forecasting superiority in the post-FD period, which suggests that there has been a leveling of the information playing field among analysts. Overall, our results reflect a trend toward greater reliance on idiosyncratic information discovery on part of the financial analysts. Quelle a été l'incidence de la réglementation en matière de communication équitable de l'information sur les activités des analystes financiers ? CondenséLa réglementation en matière de communication équitable de l'information (« réglementation » dans la suite -Reg FD [ Regulation Fair Disclosure ]) exige que les sociétés entretiennent avec les investisseurs des communications telles que tous les investisseurs obtiennent * Accepted by Greg Waymire. The authors would like to thank

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