How has the private sector reacted to the international standard against transnational bribery? Evidence from corporate anticorruption compliance programs in Argentina

Jorge, Guillermo; Basch, Fernando

doi:10.1007/s10611-013-9447-9

Cited by 10 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…There may also be equally harmful yet less visible negative outcomes such as challenges to governance (Jorge and Basch, 2013) and unfavorable reputational outcomes (Campbell, 2003). For instance, if an action is viewed as unethical by the public, it can harm an organization's legitimacy even if that action was legal (Campbell, 2003).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Dávid-Barrett

Yakis‐Douglas

Moss-Cowan

et al. 2017

Journal of Management Inquiry

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We investigate why top-down directives aimed at eradicating corruption are ineffective at altering on-the-ground practices for organizations that have adopted industry-wide "gold standards" to prevent bribery and corruption. Using interview and focus group data collected from leading multinational pharmaceutical firms, we unearth antecedents contributing to organizations' systemic failure to embed their anticorruption policies in business practice.We identify two tensions that contribute to this disconnect: a culture clash between global and local norms, especially in emerging markets and a similar disconnect between the compliance and commercial functions. To overcome these tensions, we suggest that organizations are likely to find it easier to implement a no gifts policy if they cease to rely on local agents embedded in local norms and that there needs to be strong evidence of boardlevel commitment to antibribery programs, innovative ways of incentivizing compliant behavior, and a fundamental rethinking of organizations' business model and remuneration practices.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Dávid-Barrett

Yakis‐Douglas

Moss-Cowan

et al. 2017

Journal of Management Inquiry

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“…There are also major cost implications for companies in terms of the inefficient allocation of valuable organizational resources, wasted employee time and costs associated with managing the uncertainty caused by corruption risk [31][32][33]. Being implicated in or associated with corruption can lead to challenges to corporate governance [34] and unfavorable reputational outcomes [35,36].…”

Section: Selective Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

Dávid-Barrett

2017

Crime Law Soc Change

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Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anticorruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement.

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“…Furthermore, there is an important strand of academic research in the organizational behavior literature that is attentive to corrupt practices against an organization and corrupt activities on behalf of an organization as well as to the measures organizations can take to prevent such corrupt practices (e.g., Ashforth and Anand, ; Anand et al ., ; Uhlenbruck et al ., ; Ashforth et al ., ; Pinto et al ., ; Lange, ; Misangyi et al ., ; Umphress and Bingham, ). Despite the growing body of firm‐level corruption research, our understanding of how firms respond to the increased requirements of their organizational environment regarding corruption prevention remains rather limited (Jorge and Basch, ; Schembera and Scherer, ).…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, internationally active companies need to maintain compliance with both domestic and foreign laws. Furthermore, an action that is legally permissible can harm a company's legitimacy if it is viewed as unethical by the public (Campbell, ; Jorge and Basch, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is estimated that bribery payments of approximately 1 trillion US dollars are paid annually across the globe (Rose‐Ackerman, ), making corruption one of the most challenging problems for companies operating overseas (Nichols, ). Despite the ubiquity of transnational corruption and its recent legal ban, the question of how internationally active companies react to increased expectations in their organizational environment with regard to anti‐corruption compliance remains a relatively underexplored area of research (Sanyal and Samanta, ; Jorge and Basch, ). We aim to contribute to the ongoing academic debate by empirically examining whether companies take a proactive approach to preventing corruption in their international operations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do Firms Proactively Take Measures to Prevent Corruption in Their International Operations?

Hauser

Hogenacker

2014

European Management Review

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In recent years, the fight against foreign bribery has become a critical concern for many European governments. However, empirical research on the way that internationally active firms respond to the increased requirements of their organizational environment regarding corruption prevention is quite rare. Based on the neo‐institutional theory, this paper addresses this issue using a sample of 510 internationally active Swiss firms. The findings indicate that firms do not anticipate the risk of potentially being confronted with corruption when operating in foreign countries where the level of corruption is perceived to be high. On the contrary, it seems that firms tend to follow a reactive approach toward the management of corruption risks in foreign countries and only implement measures against corruption if they have actually been confronted with the issue.

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How has the private sector reacted to the international standard against transnational bribery? Evidence from corporate anticorruption compliance programs in Argentina

Cited by 10 publications

References 9 publications

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Antibribery Compliance in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

Do Firms Proactively Take Measures to Prevent Corruption in Their International Operations?

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