How Have Political Incentives for Local Officials Reduced the Environmental Pollution of Resource-depleted Cities?

Zhang, Huiming; Xiong, Lifang; Qiu, Yueming; Zhou, Dequn

doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2017.12.776

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…The subsequent central environmental protection inspections are a major reform of China’s environmental supervision system. Zhang [23] found that under the party and government system, the effect of giving political incentives to the party secretary is more obvious than the effect of incentivizing the mayor, and the party committee secretary may play a stronger role in environmental governance. The new central environmental protection inspections are based on the same characteristics of the party and government, and the main features are different from the previous approach to supervision [24].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

2019

IJERPH

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Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

2019

IJERPH

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“…On the other hand, air pollution has not only received great emphasis from the central government, it has also caused great damage to the local environment. It threatens the local ecological environment and sustainable development in the long term, and causes irreparable damage to the physical and mental health of local residents, which also motivates the local governments to emphasize and control air pollution to a certain extent [54][55][56]. The local governments' behavioral strategy space is (Put Emphasis on Pollution Control, Neglect Pollution Control).…”

Section: Game Agent Analysis and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

Yang

2019

Sustainability

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During China's air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents' behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

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“…To encourage sustainable growth in resource-based cities, optimizing and regulating the industrial system is essential [12]. The focus of current discussions on the development of resource-based cities includes energy and environmental studies [13][14][15][16], evaluation of transformation development [17], the summary analysis of transformation policies and implementation effects [18]. The existing literature has laid the foundation for subsequent research on resource-based cities, but the analysis of this specific component of industrial structure upgrading needs to be further expanded.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of the digital economy on industrial structure upgrading in resource-based cities: Evidence from China

Li,

Zhou,

Wang

2024

PLoS ONE

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The digital economy provides a new path to promote industrial structure upgrading. Using panel data from 2011 to 2020 for 85 resource-based cities in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of the digital economy on industrial structure upgrading and the primary mechanism. The results show that the digital economy is conducive to promoting industrial structure upgrading in resource-based cities, and innovation is the primary mechanism of action. According to the different stages of resource development, we classify resource-based cities into growth, maturity, decline, and regeneration cities, and we further analyze the heterogeneous influence. In terms of influence degree, the digital economy has a more prominent role in promoting industrial structure upgrading in resource-exhausted cities. In addition, we also found that the closer to the provincial capital city, the more pronounced the promotion of the digital economy to the industrial structure upgrading.

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How Have Political Incentives for Local Officials Reduced the Environmental Pollution of Resource-depleted Cities?

Cited by 12 publications

References 5 publications

Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

The impact of the digital economy on industrial structure upgrading in resource-based cities: Evidence from China

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