How Imagination Gives Rise to Knowledge

Abstract

Though philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Sartre have dismissed imagination as epistemically irrelevant, this chapter argues that there are numerous cases in which imagining can help to justify our contingent beliefs about the world. The argument proceeds by the consideration of case studies involving two particularly gifted imaginers, Nikola Tesla and Temple Grandin. Importantly, the lessons that we learn from these case studies are applicable to cases involving less gifted imaginers as well. Though not all imaginings will have justificatory power, the chapter shows how the sorts of cases in which imagining plays an epistemic role can be easily distinguished from the sorts of cases in which it does not.

Arnon Levy, Peter Godfrey-Smith (Eds.): The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives

“…She worries about the consequences this might have for scientific creativity and progress. Skolnick Weisberg thus inverts the task set by many epistemologists and philosophers of mind who claim that we must find the proper constraints to put on imagination in order to make it reliable (Currie 2016;Kind 2018;Kung 2016). A new question, therefore, is to enquire how scientists ensure the proper breaking of constraints.…”

“…Can anything be said on behalf of those who believe that imagination itself is sometimes responsible for epistemic progress? Epistemologists and philosophers of mind have argued affirmatively (see e.g., Kind 2018;Williamson 2016), but perhaps it is time for philosophers of science to see if the special context of science provides any new reasons to believe this. 10 Many philosophers became interested in scientific imagination given the role it seems to play in certain accounts of models.…”

Imagination constrained, imagination constructed

“…We have already seen that Kind (2018) thinks of the constraints as beliefs. Myers lists several kinds of mental states as potential 'constrainers' (2021b, 105), but in his examples, the constrainers are beliefs, and the constrainers that he appeals to in his account of justification through imagination apparently have to be beliefs.…”

“…For instance, Amy Kind (2018) asks how we can put our power to create mental images to use in justifying beliefs. Her answer is that we can do that insofar as our imaginings are constrained by our beliefs.…”

DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1

“…To mention a few examples: Peter Railton 2017 discusses and defends the importance of prospection for moral learning. Amy Kind, 2016 & forthcoming, argues that imagining can play a role in justifying our beliefs and can expand our epistemic capacities. 60 John Campbell 2015 discusses the important role for imaginative empathy when we make decisions for others.…”