How Individuals Learn to Take Turns: Emergence of Alternating Cooperation in a Congestion Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Helbing, Dirk; Schönhof, Martin; Stark, Hans-Ulrich; Hołyst, Janusz A.

doi:10.1142/s0219525905000361

Cited by 113 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…1), to the repeated best-shot public good game (Bornstein et al 1997) and the repeated traffic route choice game (Helbing et al 2005). 1 In all three studies, eventual turn taking with initial coordination failure is widely observed.…”

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confidence: 97%

“…Bhaskar's result is an important normative finding. However, experimental studies suggest that turn taking in symmetric 2 × 2 games often takes the form of one-period alternation instead of time-varying sequences (Prisbrey 1992;Bornstein et al 1997;Helbing et al 2005). Another implication of the strategies used in Bhaskar (2000) is that changes in the parameter values of the game do not affect the expected length of delay.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games

Lau

Mui

2011

Theory Decis

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Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings captured by various widely studied 2 × 2 games. This article develops a repeated game model that allows us to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games, including the battle of the sexes, the game of chicken, the game of common-poolresources assignment, and a particular version of the prisoners' dilemma. We consider the "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR) strategy that achieves three objectives: (a) helping the players reach the turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who takes the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection. We determine conditions under which there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also show that there exist conditions under which an increase in the "degree of conflict" of the stage game leads to a decrease in the expected number of periods in reaching the turn-taking path.

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confidence: 97%

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confidence: 99%

Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games

Lau

Mui

2011

Theory Decis

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“…Indeed, turn-taking is commonly used in natural settings, as shown, for example, by ethnographic analyses of fishermen taking turns at fishing in preferred spots (Berkes, 1986), or anecdotal evidence of soldiers taking turns at assuming the most exposed position in a combat military formation (e.g., Rominger & James, 2003). Adults have also been shown to establish turn-taking strategies in a number of economic games (Bornstein, Budescu, & Zamir, 1997;Helbing, Schönhof, Stark, & Holyst, 2005). Turn-taking can also emerge as a stable strategy between rational agents without communication or insight (Lau & Mui, 2012) and has also been observed in various forms in a number of animal species-for example, in conflicts over coordinated movement in sticklebacks (Harcourt, Sweetman, Manica, & Johnstone, 2010), grooming patterns in macaques (Muroyama, 1991), or breeding rotations in royal penguins (Weimerskirch, Stahl, & Jouventin, 1992) suggesting that it can be an effective solution to a number of adaptive problems.…”

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Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by taking turns and along dominance asymmetries.

Grueneisen

Tomasello

2017

Developmental Psychology

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Humans constantly have to coordinate their decisions with others even when their interests are conflicting (e.g., when 2 drivers have to decide who yields at an intersection). So far, however, little is known about the development of these abilities. Here, we present dyads of 5-year-olds (N ϭ 40) with a repeated chicken game using a novel methodology: Two children each steered an automated toy train carrying a reward. The trains simultaneously moved toward each other so that in order to avoid a crash-which left both children empty-handed-1 train had to swerve. By swerving, however, the trains lost a portion of the rewards so that it was in each child's interest to go straight. Children coordinated their decisions successfully over multiple rounds, and they mostly did so by taking turns at swerving. In dyads in which turn-taking was rare, dominant children obtained significantly higher payoffs than their partners. Moreover, the coordination process was more efficient in turn-taking dyads as indicated by a significant reduction in conflicts and verbal protest. These findings indicate that already by the late preschool years children can independently coordinate decisions with peers in recurrent conflicts of interest.Keywords: coordination, cooperation, conflict, compromise, turn-taking, dominanceHumans are highly successful at coordinating their decisions with others when pursuing shared interests (Bicchieri, 2006;Tomasello, 2014). However, a central challenge of human social functioning is that people often have to coordinate even in social dilemmas in which their interests are conflicting, for example, when one of two drivers has to yield at an intersection or when deciding who has to do an undesirable part of a joint work project. What these situations have in common is that each individual prefers someone else to incur the cost of behaving cooperatively but everyone is worse off if no one volunteers to cooperate (commonly modeled as "volunteer's dilemmas" or "chicken games" in game theory; see Archetti, 2009;Rapoport & Chammah, 1966). In large modern societies these situations are often resolved through collectively agreed upon coordination rules grounded in our culturally shared normative understanding (e.g., standing in line at supermarket checkouts) and sometimes formulated in formal laws (e.g., traffic rules).In repeated dyadic interactions, however, such explicit rules often do not exist and people are frequently required to generate solutions independently, for example, when two spouses have to decide who picks up the kids from school. One solution to dyadic conflict-of-interest coordination problems is to take turns at behaving cooperatively as this ensures that the interaction is mutually profitable in the long run. Indeed, turn-taking is commonly used in natural settings, as shown, for example, by ethnographic analyses of fishermen taking turns at fishing in preferred spots (Berkes, 1986), or anecdotal evidence of soldiers taking turns at assuming the most exposed position in a combat military formati...

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“…Instead of reaching the state that maximizes the overall success, the system may instead converge to a user equilibrium, where the success (''payoff'') of every system component is the same, but lower than it could be. This happens, for example, in traffic systems with the consequence of excess travel times 14 . In conclusion, if everybody tries to reach the best outcome for him-or herself, this may lead to overall bad results and social dilemmas 15 (the ''tragedy of the commons'' 16 ).…”

Section: Self-organization Competition and Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Complexity in Socio-Economic Systems

Helbing¹

2009

European Review

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This contribution summarizes some typical features of complex systems such as non-linear interactions, chaotic dynamics, the ''butterfly effect'', phase transitions, self-organized criticality, cascading effects, and power laws. These imply sometimes quite unexpected, counter-intuitive, or even paradoxical behaviors of socioeconomic systems. A typical example is the faster-is-slower effect. Due to their tendency of self-organization, complex systems are often hard to control. Instead of trying to control their behavior, it would often be better to pursue the approach of guided self-organization, i.e. to use the driving forces of the system rather than to fight against them. This is illustrated by the example of hierarchical systems, which need to fulfill certain principles in order to be efficient and robust in an ever-changing environment. We also discuss the important role of fluctuations and heterogeneity for the adaptability, flexibility and robustness of complex systems. The presentation is enriched by a number of examples ranging from decision behavior up to production systems and disaster spreading.

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How Individuals Learn to Take Turns: Emergence of Alternating Cooperation in a Congestion Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Cited by 113 publications

References 60 publications

Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games

Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games

Children coordinate in a recurrent social dilemma by taking turns and along dominance asymmetries.

Managing Complexity in Socio-Economic Systems

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