How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy

European Consensus between Strategy and Principle

“…1400 The importance of the States parties as agents of legitimacy is usually explained, above all, by their "power to affect the court's interests". 1401 For one thing, any individual Member State might, if it does not perceive the Court and its judgments as legitimate, refuse to implement said judgments (whether when directly concerned as respondent State or proactively based on rulings against other States) or even denounce the Convention entirely (Article 58 ECHR). 1402 Collectively, 1403 the Member States might refuse to enforce certain judgments (in their role as members of the Committee of Ministers 1404 ), withdraw funding from the Court, reform it in such a way as to suit their preferences or, at the extreme, give up the Convention system as a whole -recall the worry about the "collapse of the Strasbourg system".…”

Teorías relativas al cumplimiento del derecho internacional público

“…35 Sobre este punto concuerda Dothan en su estudio sobre los mecanismos que incrementan la legitimidad de los tribunales internacionales. 36 El incumplimiento implicaría, entonces, una inconsistencia entre los intereses del Estado y el contenido de las normas internacionales, incluidas las sentencias emitidas por tribunales internacionales. 37 Esta teoría parecería no tener una respuesta en el caso de los tribunales de derechos humanos, ya que no están claros los beneficios que obtendría el Estado al cumplir con las medidas de reparación ordenadas.…”