How international law impacts on statelessness and citizenship: the case of Kurdish nationalism, conflict and peace

Abstract

This paper argues for a new approach to understanding statelessness. It explores the limits of international laws on statelessness and the relationships between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism. It discusses how the condition of statelessness has affected Kurds, and how statelessness has been constructed and experienced at an individual and collective level in the diaspora. It argues for an expanded definition of the international laws of ‘stateless’ person: adding to the accepted de jure and highly contested de facto definitions, by also suggesting a third, new, category of ‘socially stateless’ people. The paper examines the concept of diaspora itself from the perspective of Kurdish interviewees and explores how, for stateless groups like Kurds, ‘living in diaspora’ can mean more than one place, including their land of origin. It will suggest the concept of ‘double’ or ‘multiple’ diasporas, where stateless people do not feel that they belong either to their country of origin or to the country in which they now live. The paper discusses the idea that when an ethnic community is stateless, then even those individuals who have an official nationality, citizenship or passport may often describe themselves as stateless. The relationship between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism is highlighted; and the impact of this on diaspora involvement in homeland politics, conflict and peace is explored. The paper also argues that the lack of protection which international law(s) offer around statelessness paradoxically create new forms of nationalism.

Peace Making or State Breaking? The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Processes and the Role of Diasporas

“…In this article, I am using the world 'diaspora' to mean both a place and group of people. I have already discussed elsewhere (Tas 2014a(Tas , 2016) that for stateless people, diaspora is not just the 'home away from the original homeland' or 'dispersal of people from their original homeland' described by many researchers (see Connor 1986;Safran 1991;Van Hear 1998;Tölölyan 1996;Cohen 1997;Palmer 1998). Forced internal migration can create diaspora within a nation-state.…”

“…Continuing state oppression, weak citizenship, differential minority classification and treatment (Ustundag 2016), and an unsafe living environment all mean that even the ancestral homeland can feel like a diaspora. For that reason stateless Kurds do not just have one diaspora, they have double or even triple diasporas (Tas 2016). For example, a Kurdish family from Diyarbakir, in eastern Turkey, may feel as though they are living in a diaspora.…”

“…This example demonstrates that the Kurdish stateless diaspora has already been an active, influential actor in policies affecting its homeland. One of my interviewees explained in November 2014 (Tas 2016):…”

Reconsidering nationalism and feminism: the Kurdish political movement in Turkey

“…The empirical context for our specific case study has been rapidly and radically shifting since we conceived of our project in the beginning of 2015. At the time, a peace process between the Turkish government and the Kurdish political movement was on its way following peace negotiations (Tas , ). As we have shown elsewhere, these negotiations were problematic and unsuccessful for various complex reasons (Ibid).…”

“War Is like a Blanket”

“…Previous peace talks have left out some important key players, including diaspora Kurds. Internally displaced and international diaspora Kurds often remain politically active when it comes to Turkish-Kurdish issues (Tas 2016a(Tas , 2016b). As we have illustrated previously, transnational political mobilization is gendered in that men and women might have access to different resources and networks and are operating within specific gender norms and relations, both within the country of residence and their country of origin (Al-Ali 2007).…”