How Is Power Shared in Africa?

François, Patrick; Rainer, Ilia; Trebbi, Francesco

doi:10.3982/ecta11237

Cited by 174 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“… 6 One important concern with our power-sharing argument is that most scholars think of power sharing exclusively in terms of high profile accords, which are relatively rare in Africa. This view of power sharing, however, has been challenged recently by Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) who argue power sharing in Africa frequently occurs through cabinet appointments. Their data show that ministerial posts are distributed across ethnic groups in a way that reflects their relative size.…”

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confidence: 99%

“… 9 See the online appendix for a formal illustration of this proposition. Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) argue that African leaders are more likely to share power in the post-Cold War period because of declining levels of intervention. They note, citing Hentz (2004), that US aid was cut to less than half of its peak level of $2.4 billion in 1985 during the post-Cold War period.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Elections and Civil War in Africa

Cheibub¹,

Hays²

2015

PSRM

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The view that multiparty elections in changing authoritarian regimes should be held sooner rather than later has been increasingly under attack. Critics argue that, under conditions of low institutional development, multiparty elections may lead to violence and civil war, rather than to the peaceful allocation of authority that everyone desires. Starting from the premise that elections are strategically timed and endogenous in transitioning authoritarian regimes, that is, more likely to be held when violence is imminent, we show that for Africa, the continent with the lowest levels of political institutionalization, elections do not increase the probability of a civil war initiation. In fact, for the post-Cold War period, the holding of multiparty elections is actually associated with a substantial reduction in the probability of civil war onset. To account for this pattern, we develop an informational theory of elections held under conditions that prevail in the post-Cold War, when foreign powers are reluctant to provide direct support for dictators (or their opponents) and elections are more reflective of the true level of a leader’s strength. We argue that, under these conditions, elections may prevent the eruption of a civil war that is already imminent, through two mechanisms: they may deter a weak opposition from initiating a war they are likely to lose or they may induce a weak dictator to offer ways to share power with the opposition.

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Elections and Civil War in Africa

Cheibub¹,

Hays²

2015

PSRM

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“…We suggest that the interplay among local leading cadres shapes policy outcomes. 2 We also contribute to the literature investigating power structures within institutionally weak political settings (Francois, Ilia, & Trebbi, 2015;Gehlbach & Keefer, 2012;Rainer & Trebbi, 2014). Our paper implies that power struggles among local elites could distort the implementation of directives issued by the centre.…”

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confidence: 89%

Power struggle and pork barrel politics in authoritarian countries: Evidence from China

Gao

Liang

2020

Econ of Transit and Inst Chang

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This paper examines how power struggle among cliques within ruling parties shape public policies. We develop a simple model of bargaining among ruling elites to study government staffing and use it to explain why the number of subnational government staff in China has increased rapidly despite repeated government streamlining programs initiated by the central authority. Using provincial-level panel data in China from 1992 to 2011, we show that the subnational government headed by a politically weaker party secretary, in terms of the size of the opposition of elites in the provincial standing committee, tends to have a larger number of senior cadres and public employees. Notably, the party secretary's power from the centre mitigates the tendency to expand government staff. We also provide suggestive evidence that the local government finances government expansion by selling more land.

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“…There is a rich literature on the relationship between political inequalities and ethnic conflict. Political power provides groups with a channel through which to express their interests and address their grievances (Francois, Rainer, and Tebbi 2015). If groups are politically represented at the state level, they should be able to better exercise and defend their political rights, as well as influence the distribution of public goods and services (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).…”

Section: Political Inequality and Ethnic Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

Alcorta¹,

Swedlund

Smits³

2020

International Interactions

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The literature on political exclusion and conflict tends to treat grievance-based mechanisms with broad-brush strokes and does not differentiate between types of political exclusion. This study disaggregates politically-excluded groups into two subgroups: groups that experience political discrimination from the state, and groups without political power that are not explicitly discriminated against. We posit that discriminated groups are more likely to experience grievances and therefore are more prone to conflict than excluded groups that are not actively discriminated against. We further posit that the effect of discrimination on conflict is moderated by interactions with economic inequalities and the share of elites. Using dyadic data for 155 ethnic groups in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that among politically-excluded groups it is indeed discriminated groups that are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Additionally, we find that discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict.

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How Is Power Shared in Africa?

Cited by 174 publications

References 52 publications

Elections and Civil War in Africa

Elections and Civil War in Africa

Power struggle and pork barrel politics in authoritarian countries: Evidence from China

Discrimination and ethnic conflict: a dyadic analysis of politically-excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa

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