How Many and Why? Size Variation of National Delegations to Plenary Meetings of International Organizations

Abstract

This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings of international organizations. Plenary meetings represent a symbol of national sovereignty and equality which is, however, often sidelined by structural opportunities and internal incentives which states have in practice. This article addresses the puzzle of whether the size of national delegations varies and what factors can explain possible geographical patterns. Drawing upon opportunity structure-incentive approach and using a newly created dataset covering 14 major agencies of the United Nations family, I suggest that it is mainly the structural factors what affects the size of national delegations, especially the power distribution. The findings also indicate that complex negotiations in large IOs motivate states to increase their delegation size, while regional cooperation allows them to delegate less representatives and rely on regional partners. Domestic incentives, on the contrary, seem to play little role, except for anticipated financial benefits from membership in the particular IOs.

Who cares about the UN General Assembly? National delegations size from 1993 to 2016

“…Again, countries that control significant financial capacities are more active in negotiations (Panke, 2017a), place more nationals in the international bureaucracies (Novosad & Werker, 2019; Parizek, 2017; Parizek & Stephen, 2021), and provide financial aid to other member states in exchange for their support in the decision‐making (Dreher et al, 2008). Wealthier states also delegate more national representatives to multilateral meetings than countries with fewer financial capacities (Kaya & Schofield, 2020; Onderco, 2019; Vlcek, 2021). Therefore, we may expect that countries with more financial capacities delegate more national representatives to the UNGA sessions than countries with fewer financial resources (H1b).…”