How Much Data for the Political Theorist? On the Argumentative Normative Behaviourism

Abstract

Jonathan Floyd’s work explores the ways in which political theory can use empirical data to answer a fundamental question: what is the best kind of a contemporary regime? The goals of the current article are to understand Floyd’s important argument, to clarify the argument’s main attributes, and to suggest that the argument cannot rely solely on empirical data: even if all the conditions that are necessary for Floyd’s framework present themselves, his approach still requires substantial theoretical, normative, or philosophical foundations. I argue that it is not possible to rely on empirical data to circumvent political philosophising; the justification for such reliance itself requires substantial philosophical arguments. Regardless, Floyd’s project is a leading example of the benefits of bringing political theory and political science closer to each other.

Normative Behaviourism: A Reply

“…Do we though really see these verdicts with anything like the clarity I claim? Consider, for example, Perez’s argument that normative behaviourism requires behavioural patterns of a certain quality, which for him means sufficient certainty, clear thresholds, a precise ranking among rival preferences, and even a solid theory of their background, in the sense of the conditions needed for us to know when our actions really are an expression of the relevant preferences (Perez, 2023: 3–5). When we look at insurrection, for instance, how much is enough to be problematic, and under what circumstances?…”